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SUMMARY 
  This research builds further on the existing conceptual framework of the 
relationship between decentralization and service delivery and provides a cross-country 
empirical examination of the core dimensions of decentralization reform on access to two 
key services: health care and improved drinking water sources.  The regression results 
provide evidence supporting positive and significant effects of fiscal, administrative, and 
political decentralization, individually, on the variables used to measure access to health 
care, and improved water provision; although the size and robustness of such effects 
varies for each dimension of decentralization in relation to each service examined.  The 
results obtained in this study suggest that there is an additional (or ―extra‖) positive effect 
coming from the interaction of two decentralization dimensions on access to health care 
and water services (that is, a mutually-reinforcing effect additional to the individual 
effect of each dimension of decentralization).   The results obtained also support the 
expectation that developing countries could benefit significantly more from 
decentralization reforms compared to developed countries. These findings underscore the 
importance of considering all dimensions of the decentralization process when 
investigating the effects of this reform on any economic, institutional, or social variable. 
The policy implications are highly relevant, particularly for developing countries: 
decentralization implemented only through one dimension may render fewer positive 
fruits in terms of access to services than a multi-dimensional approach.  Moreover, 
learning more about the most beneficial mutually-reinforcing effects across dimensions 
of decentralization may also help strategically in how the overall decentralization reform 
is designed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A key argument supporting decentralization reform is that it can improve public 
service provision by better matching finances with local needs. This study evaluates the 
effects of decentralization on access to and intermediate outputs of two essential services 
that are typically transferred to sub-national governments
1
 as a part of the 
decentralization process: health and water provision. To do so, this study provides an 
analytical framework to examine the relationships between decentralization and service 
delivery of health and water, and then provides a cross-country empirical analysis testing 
these relationships. To account for decentralization in a comprehensive manner, this 
study measures the fiscal, administrative, and political dimensions of decentralization.        
Motivation  
A critical question in development economics is what kind of reforms developing 
and transition countries should undertake to improve basic service delivery and thereby 
enhance the standards of living for their people. Decentralization of powers to sub-
national governments is one of the key reforms with wide implications on this issue. 
Despite the fact that most countries have initially pursued decentralization seeking goals 
different than economic efficiency and improvement in service delivery, this has been 
one of the supporting rationales for decentralization reform provided by many economists 
and other experts.  
                                                 
1
 In this study, ―sub-national governments‖ refers to all state and local governments below the central (or 
federal) government level.  
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Aside from the general motivation arising from the importance of evaluating this 
relationship, particularly for developing countries, the following are specific motivating 
factors for this study. First, despite a large body of literature on the impact of 
decentralization on government size, growth, and macro-economic stability, only a few 
studies have evaluated the effects of decentralization on service delivery.  
Second, the few existing studies on this issue examine a single service in a single 
country. While this approach has the advantage of presenting a more focused and detailed 
view, it does not help to examine the effects of more or less decentralized systems on 
service delivery, consequently they tend to fall short in evaluating the effect of a 
decentralization process as whole on a particular service. Hence, international 
comparisons and cross-country empirical evidence, as attempted in this research, on the 
effects of decentralization on service delivery, are very important to shed more light on 
this issue.  
Third, most of the research on this topic evaluates the effects of decentralization 
on final outcomes of public services. That is, the dependent variables used include infant 
mortality rates, education completion, student performance, and so on. But while having 
final outcomes as dependent variables may seem a straightforward way to evaluate 
effects of decentralization policy it is also highly treacherous. Indeed, services outcomes, 
such as infant mortality for example, may depend heavily on a variety of geographic, 
demographic, social, and political factors. Infant mortality rates also depend on other 
public services aside from health care itself in a country such as quality of water, 
education, social protection programs and safety nets, which in turn makes extremely 
complex to argue a direct attribution to any institutional variable or policy change. This 
  3 
situation raises the need for approaching the analysis of the relationship between 
decentralization and service delivery in a different way.  This research examines 
intermediate outputs (e.g., coverage of certain services) or ―access‖ as opposed to final 
outcomes of services as dependent variables. For example, the World Development 
Report  (2004) produced by the World Bank argues that availability of doctors to perform 
basic services (e.g., pre-natal, birth, and maternal care services), immunization coverage, 
and other similar intermediate outputs in health care are essential for improving public 
service in this sector. The same report argues that access to improved drinking water 
services is essential in developing countries in order to improve service outcomes such as 
reduced poor health conditions arising from consumption of contaminated water or for 
raising quality of life in general. Thus, the use of intermediate outputs such as access and 
availability of certain intermediate outputs (or even inputs as called by the literature in 
health and education)  in service delivery is a more direct route that this study takes with 
the aim of providing relevant insights about how decentralization is performing regarding 
the improvement of public services.         
Fourth, the empirical literature has analyzed the impact of decentralization on 
public services from a single dimension (fiscal, administrative, or political) rather than 
from all three simultaneously.  Allowing for interaction of all three dimensions of 
decentralization in the same analysis can bring more robust evidence on the relationship 
between decentralization and access to service delivery and hence bring stronger basis for 
providing policy advice in the future.  
Fifth, this research is also motivated by the possibility of bringing, as control 
variables, other key governance factors that only occasionally are part of the analysis of 
  4 
this relationship in the literature.  Most of the studies have the typical variables to control 
for socio-economic country characteristics in their empirical models (such as income per 
capita, growth, demographic aspects, and the like). However, they do not pull into the 
discussion governance aspects that may be constraining service delivery. Pritchett (1996) 
argues that one unit of budgeted expenditure, whether it is decentralized expenditure or 
not, does not necessarily translate into one unit of actual service spending. The latter is 
also evidenced by Ablo and Reinikka (1998), who found that on average schools in 
Uganda received only 13 percent of the budgetary allocation for non-wage expenditures, 
the rest being diluted due corruption or misappropriation to other activity. However, 
when we review the literature that evaluates the effects of decentralization on service 
delivery, institutional (governance) factors are often absent in the control variables.   
 In short, this study tackles key aspects often overlooked in the literature on 
decentralization, as a way to deepen our understanding of the effects of this reform on 
key public services.   
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction  
The literature on decentralization and its effects on socio-economic variables is 
too vast to review here. Instead, this Chapter discusses the existing literature on the 
relationship of decentralization and service delivery, with a focus on health care and 
water provision services. More specifically, this chapter aims to lay down the basis for a 
more structured analytical framework to examine this relationship in the subsequent 
chapter. It starts by discussing the literature that examines the vehicles through which 
decentralization and its three dimensions (fiscal, administrative, and political) can 
improve service delivery. Then it discusses the literature with specific arguments and 
evidence on the effects of the three dimensions of decentralization on health care and 
water provision. Finally, it discusses the literature that argues for the incorporation of 
institutional-governance variables in the examination of changes in service delivery due 
to institutional/economic reforms (such as decentralization).        
Decentralization and its vehicles for improved service delivery:  theory and 
evidence. 
How does decentralization create efficiency gains in service provision? 
A premise commonly articulated in the literature on this topic is that many of the 
anticipated benefits of decentralization flow from bringing decision makers and decision 
making closer to the people and their needs. Classic descriptions of the benefits of 
decentralization typically argue along the following lines of reasoning (for example, see 
Tiebout 1956 and Musgrave 1959): local decision-makers have access to better 
  6 
information on local conditions than central authorities; this knowledge allows them to 
better tailor services and public spending patterns to local needs and preferences; this in 
turn, with other things hold constant, is expected to improve efficiency and quality of 
services for local constituents.  
Economists such as Oates (1972) examine heterogeneity in tastes and spillovers 
from public goods through models in which local government can adapt outputs to local 
tastes, whereas central government produces a common level of public goods for all 
localities. Thus, sub-national governments that are closer to the citizens can adjust 
budgets to local preferences in a manner that best leads to the delivery of the bundle of 
public services that is more fitted and responsive to community preferences. Economists 
commonly assume a better match between local government outputs and local 
preferences under decentralization, and consequently rate local provision of services as 
more efficient, unless this situation is outweighed by spillovers or other efficiencies (for 
example, economies of scale) in central government provision (Oates 1972). Tiebout 
(1956), argues that decentralization is a vehicle to fulfill highly heterogeneous demand 
that may arise from different local governments.   
Scholars also examine the efficiency argument supporting decentralization from 
the perspective of consumers’ gains due to allocative efficiency and producers’ (e.g., 
government) gains in technical efficiency in delivering goods and services. Allocative 
efficiency may arise due to a more fitted bundle (i.e., set and composition) of services 
provided by the local government to their citizens; in other words, through the adjustment 
that may take place in the proportions of public spending geared to services such as 
education, health, water provision or others based on local government’s response to 
  7 
local claims in a decentralized context. Faguet (2000) and Arze (2003) provide evidence 
to this effect (this is later discussed in more detail for specific services). Higher technical 
efficiency is achieved when larger quantities and quality of goods and services are 
provided with the same amount of resources (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2002). 
Overall, devolving some of the centralized responsibilities to local levels has been 
envisaged in most decentralization agendas as a way to improve both allocative and 
technical efficiency across different public services (Wallich 1994, Ebel 2002).  
Several economists have argued that the efficiency gains that could be achieved 
owing to decentralization could also be outweighed by other efficiency gains arising from 
central provision such as economies of scale, ability to attract better personnel, and the 
like (De Mello 2004; Tanzi 1996). This indeed is a valid argument, but other scholars 
have also argued that those gains arising from central provision may also be 
overestimated (Oates 1972; Prud’homme 1995, Sewell and Wallich 1995). Nonetheless, 
the theory that allocative and efficiency gains could be achieved have important 
implications for improving public service delivery that need to be evaluated, specially in 
the context of developing and transition countries.   
It is also argued that efficiency gains in service delivery have to be examined 
from the accountability perspective (e.g., Prud’homme 1993; Treisman 2002). For 
example, Rondinelli (1990) argued that central government ministries rarely have the 
incentives to perceive citizens as their clients. In the same line, Dillinger (1994) 
suggested that systems where central ministries concentrate large proportions of 
expenditure discretion would have more difficulties responding to their national 
  8 
constituencies’ demands. He argues that in those systems, people have fewer channels of 
communication and expression with the government.  
How does decentralization in each of its dimensions (fiscal, administrative and political) 
shape the sub-national service provision?  
Sufficient fiscal resources and discretion over them are core components of a 
decentralized framework of service provision. If local governments are to carry out 
expenditure responsibilities and provide public services in a decentralized manner 
effectively, they should be able to have an adequate level of revenues to afford those 
decentralized functions, either through locally raised revenues, which could bring greater 
accountability (McLure 2002), through transferred resources from the central 
government, or through other sources (further discussed below). At the same time, 
however, local government should be endowed with an adequate level of discretion to 
make the decisions about how to use those revenues and thus fulfill the public service 
functions
2
 they expected to deliver (Bird 1986).  
The intergovernmental fiscal framework typically has a 4 pillar structure: 
expenditure responsibilities, revenue assignments, transfers, and sub-national borrowing. 
In other words, within this fiscal framework sub-national governments finance their 
expenditure responsibilities (goods and services provided) through the following 
channels: first, self-financing using local tax revenues, user charges, or shared revenues 
with the central government; second, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, either through 
general purpose block transfers or earmarked-specific purpose transfers; and third 
through sub-national borrowing. In the context of service delivery at the local level, 
                                                 
2
 Local government functions vary from country to country, but they typically include primary and 
secondary health care, water and sanitation services, primary and secondary education, and public works on 
local infrastructure, among others.  
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financing options have also diversified to include public-private partnerships, co-
financing or co-production arrangements through which the users participate in providing 
services and infrastructure through monetary or labor contributions, and other co-
participative schemes, all these avenues have also been encouraged by decentralization 
processes (Litvack and Seddon 1999). 
There are, of course, different levels of discretion in the use of fiscal resources 
that central governments establish. They are geared to assure certain level of spending in 
specific goods and services provided by sub-national budgets. They depend on a variety 
of factors such as local capacity to administer resources, fiscal considerations, national 
goals, political issues, and institutional constraints. From the fiscal dimension the central 
government typically may be able to control spending allocations through strings 
attached in shared revenues and transfers to local governments (i.e., earmarked transfers 
or conditional transfers), through sub-national borrowing controls, or through other fiscal 
means (Arze and Martinez-Vazquez 2003).  The government can also place borrowing 
controls or even tighten local borrowing to solely raise resources for certain categories of 
goods and services provided at the local level (World Bank 2007). Because of all these 
(and other) considerations, measuring fiscal decentralization presents several 
complexities and limitations when examining it empirically (Martinez and McNab 2001, 
Bird 2000b, Ebel 2002). The issue of measuring the level of fiscal decentralization is 
further discussed in the following chapters and it is examined in detail in Appendix A. 
Administrative decentralization deals directly with the powers of local officials 
who are responsible for delivering services in issues such as personnel, service facilities, 
general management, and other administrative discretion in day-to-day operations.   
  10 
Rondinelli (1981) offers the most widely used classification of the types of administrative 
decentralization: de-concentration, delegation, and devolution.   
De-concentration gives sub-national governments some responsibilities within a 
sector, but all relevant decisions are made by the ministerial branches. A typical model is 
for the central line ministries and agencies to have local representatives that manage 
services within the sub-national governments but respond hierarchically to their own 
central office. (Rondinelli 1981 and Wallich and Seddon 1999). Under this type of 
administrative decentralization, local governments typically can not hire or fire 
personnel, do not set salary levels, and can not change the structure of the network of 
service facilities in place (i.e., number, size, and type of facilities).  Local branches and 
representatives in charge of services simply manage day-to-day operations on behalf of 
the central ministry and under its watchful eye.     
Delegation involves the transfer of implementation functions to sub-national 
entities that deliver services.  Through delegation, the central government transfers 
responsibility for implementation and administration to local governments, including 
service facilities not completely controlled by central ministries, but ultimately 
accountable to it (Rondinelli 1981).   The ―delegation‖ scheme is a blend between de-
concentration and devolution (explained below), thus, the levels of decision-making 
power vary significantly within that range across countries. In some countries delegation 
implies some personnel responsibilities passed down, but in others this may not be case 
(this is discussed in more detail for heath care and water services later in this chapter). 
Overall, the more routine operations are local discretion but more strategic and some 
personnel decisions remain at the central level.  
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Finally, devolution is a more complete transfer of administrative decision-making 
power to sub-national authorities. It empowers them with legal decision-making power 
and the ability to generate and control resources, including the sub-national public sector 
employees hiring and firing, career management and pay. Moreover, typically it provides 
local government with the ability to reallocate resources (including staff) across service 
facilities within their jurisdiction adapting to local circumstances (World Bank 2007). 
Often, nevertheless, some central guidelines need to be followed, mainly with the aim of 
pursuing national objectives in certain areas.  
Political decentralization gives citizens through their elected leaders more power 
in public decision-making. It is often associated with a pluralistic setting and a 
representative government (Stuti Kemani 2001). The premise is that service delivery 
policies taken at the sub-national level will be better informed and more relevant to 
diverse interests in society than those taken only by national political authorities. More 
importantly, political decentralization may help to strengthen accountability, which is 
necessary for improved service delivery (WDR 2004). If local elected officials make 
policy decisions about services that affect citizens, they in turn can hold the local officials 
accountable and remove them from power in the next local elections.      
What does the literature present in terms of evidence in the relationship between 
decentralization and service provision?  
As for the argument of allocative efficiency, an empirical study developed in local 
governments in Colombia (World Bank 1995) presented interesting insights. Using 
survey data and government expenditure data from 16 municipalities, this study analyzed 
the match between government provision of services (central and local) vis a vis local 
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preferences.  In the study, most respondents to the survey indicated that they trusted local 
governments’ elected officials more than the national government’s to deliver goods and 
services. The findings suggested that the allocation of resources made by local 
governments was more consistent with community preferences than allocations from the 
center.   
Faguet (2000) performed an in-depth study of fiscal decentralization in Bolivia 
with the objective of evaluating the influence of this process on changes in expenditure 
patterns at the local level. His results showed that following Bolivia’s fiscal 
decentralization reform spending patterns changed (through sharp increases in relative 
funding levels) in favor of education, water and sanitation, water management, 
agriculture and urban development.   Moreover, Faguet’s study found that these changes 
are strongly positively related to real local needs, supporting the argument of allocative 
efficiency. That is, he found that increased investment in education, water and sanitation, 
water management, were steeper where illiteracy rates were higher and water and 
sewerage connection rates lower.   
Arze (2003) also finds a change in expenditure composition following higher 
fiscal decentralization. More specifically, this study finds a sharper increase in health and 
education spending as a percentage of total spending with more decentralization, with 
stronger results for developing countries. Developing countries in average spent a smaller 
share of their budgets in these sectors and have poorer education and health outputs and 
outcomes. Thus, one could infer that improvements in allocative efficiency may be taking 
place as result of further fiscal decentralization.     
  13 
 At the same time, many claim that higher public spending in a specific sector, 
even if this is what the population demands, does not necessarily lead to better final 
outcomes (Inchauste 2000; Pritchett 1996; Ablo and Reinikka, 1998). For instance, both 
in Cote d’ Ivoire and Haiti per capita health spending fell to below five dollars from the 
1980’s through the 1990’s but with a different result in each of these countries: infant 
mortality rates worsened severely in the African country and  improved in Haiti (WDR 
2004). Another example is the big difference in per capita public spending in health 
between Mexico and Jordan, but with both countries having similar reductions in 
mortality rates. 
3
  
Kaufmann et al. (2002) evaluate decentralization effects on access to public 
services. Using a survey of local agencies, this study found that both local and central 
service providers in Bolivia were falling short in delivering an adequate quantity and 
quality of services, but local agencies were more successful in being accessible to 
citizens
4
, particularly for the poorer brackets of population segments. As decentralization 
is still an unfolding process (in this country and others), the positive results in access of 
services to poor people might be an preliminary indication of future improvement in final 
outcomes such as infant mortality rates, as poor people are the most vulnerable.   
The cross-country and country-specific evidence discussed earlier points toward 
the existence of specific attributes and effects of decentralized service provision in terms 
of      responsiveness and improvement in access to service delivery. However, this is just 
a first step in identifying the effects of decentralization on public services. The rest of this 
                                                 
3
 World Bank’s World Development Report (2004).   
4
 Respondents claimed lower waiting times and lower payments for service in local service providers.  
  14 
section is devoted to discussing the arguments and evidence provided in the literature 
regarding decentralization and its impact on two specific services, health care and water 
provision.      
Decentralization and its effects on the health sector:  arguments and evidence.   
The general argument for decentralizing health care is that greater local 
participation in health policy and local accountability can lead to improved quantity 
(including coverage) and quality of service. Yet, exactly how these benefits can be 
realized and the impact of different kinds of reforms is not well understood (Litvack and 
Seddon 1999). The highly differentiated levels of health provision (i.e., primary, 
secondary, and tertiary) and several additional aspects of health care, such as family 
planning, information campaigns, and the training and supervision of personnel, make the 
effects of decentralization on this service more difficult to understand, particularly when 
looking at final outcomes. 
Moreover, DeMello (2004) stated that decentralization in the health sector tends 
to be more complex than in other sectors because diseconomies of scale. He argues that 
these diseconomies of scale tend to discourage sub-national governments in the provision 
of costly curative treatments and immunization. At the same time, he argues, spillover 
effects tend to discourage the sub-national provision of preventive health care, 
particularly immunization and epidemiological controls.    
Nevertheless, decentralization of the health sector has become appealing to many 
researchers, international donors, and policy makers because it raises expectations about 
several advantages including the following (Mills 1994, p.24): 
• A less unified health service that is better tailored to local preferences. 
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• Improved success in the implementation health programs. That is, day-to-day 
overlooking and evaluation, which are necessary for implementation, are more 
likely to succeed under local accountability   
• Reduced inequalities between urban and rural areas and between accessible      
and secluded regions of the country. This is assumed to occur due to proximity 
and responsiveness of rural local governments and providers to the needs of rural 
people—typically, in poorer countries rural areas tend to be more underserved 
than urban areas. 
• Lower costs due to better targeted programs. This argument assumes that local 
service providers would tend to have better information about the local population 
to better allocate resources to target the poorer income groups.  
• Greater community involvement and higher chance of sustainability in the long- 
run.  
Little concrete evidence confirms these potential benefits, however. Few developing 
countries have long-term experience with health sector decentralization, and its impact on 
the management of the sector and on the services it delivers has rarely been evaluated 
(DeMello 2004).   
Fiscal decentralization in the health sector 
Many developing countries have decentralized the public health care system in 
the last twenty years, but little empirical research has been conducted on the effects of 
these fiscal changes in the health sector (Guilkey and Racelis, 2002). Robalino, Picazo 
and Voetberg (2001) developed one of the few existing cross-country evaluations of this 
relationship. This study focuses on the impact of fiscal decentralization on infant 
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mortality rates, which is a typical final outcome used in the literature to measure policies’ 
impact on health care. Using panel data that includes developing and developed countries 
from 1970 to 1995, this study finds that countries where local governments manage a 
higher share of public expenditures tend to have lower mortality rates. Additionally, the 
authors argue that in their sample of countries, the share of public expenditures managed 
by local governments was correlated with their level of administrative capacity. 
Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2001) suggest only when local governments have 
stronger administrative capacity is fiscal decentralization likely to improve health 
outcomes. This implies the need for evaluating fiscal and administrative decentralization 
jointly (i.e., in the same model in empirical models).  
Cross-country evaluation like the one discussed above has been to a great extent 
neglected in the evaluation of fiscal decentralization and health outcomes. Rather, 
specific country case studies (some with empirical analysis) have been used to shed light 
on that relationship.  Schwartz, Guilkey, and Racelis (2002) analyzed audited line-item 
annual expenditure reports for about 1600 local governments the Philippines before and 
after the decentralization process started in 1994.
5
  The study also combines these data 
with secondary census and demographic data in order to examine changes in the level and 
composition of local government health expenditures and the impact of these 
expenditures on the consumption of public health goods and services before and after 
decentralization.   The results suggest that per capita expenditures in health increased 
                                                 
 
5
 The same study has been applied to other countries like Tanzania, Paraguay and Uganda with similar 
results. These studies were performed under the MEASURE evaluation project (sponsored by USAID) 
conducted by the North Carolina Population Center between 2000 and 2003 (University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill). 
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immediately following devolution and continued to increase in 1995 and 1998 compared 
with per capita expenditure levels of prior years. They state that per capita increases 
appear to be more pronounced for provincial expenditures than for municipal 
expenditures, probably because more costly responsibilities in hospitals were devolved to 
provincial governments. The results also suggest that local governments, which had 
discretionary authority over unconditional transfers, allocated increasing shares of total 
resources to health at the expense of other locally provided government services 
following the decentralization process. This latter finding is line with that of Arze (2003), 
who argues that increased shares of spending in health and education follow higher levels 
of fiscal decentralization across countries. 
Nevertheless, even in fiscal matters, local accountability is apparently a key 
element. A study developed by Khemani (2004) on 30 local governments in Nigeria 
presented evidence that the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations has an important 
effect on local accountability and ultimately on health services
6
.  This study found a 
widespread situation of non-payment of public health facilities’ personnel, which led to 
lower quality of service (e.g., higher doctor absenteeism, lower drug availability). 
Moreover, Khemani (2004) argued that this situation can not be explained solely by lack 
of financial resources available for health services to local governments but rather by lack 
of local accountability on those resources. This study suggests that conditional transfers 
which are the main source of local health spending may be damaging local accountability 
because the public does not hold local officials accountable for those resources.  
Administrative decentralization in the health sector 
                                                 
6
 This study is based on a survey undertaken by Das Gupta, Gauri and Khemani (2004) in the Nigerian 
States of Kogi and Lagos, covering 30 local governments, 252 public primary care health facilities and over 
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In the health sector in developing countries, the most common type of 
decentralization is a combination of de-concentration and delegation (Silverman, 1992; 
Bronfman, 1998).  Analyzing the shift of administrative power from the center to the sub-
national levels can be a difficult task. A great variety of elements need to be taken into 
account: for example, there are a great variety of projects and functions in which sub-
national governments participate in coordination with line ministries that make that task 
complex. Bossert (1998) characterizes the range of powers and responsibilities as the 
―decision space‖ given to local governments on issues such as service organization, 
hospital autonomy, civil service, access rules, and governance rules.  Probably the ones 
that make the biggest difference about how sub-national governments provide a service 
are the discretion on personnel and decision making power on facilities’structure (Cohen 
2002).    
In Colombia, Bossert et al. (2000) examined the effects of increased ―decision 
space‖, finding that administrative decentralization increased utilization of health services 
and health  expenditures per capita. For the cases of Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and the 
Philippines, Bossert and Beauvais (2002) found that the supposedly decentralized health 
systems allowed only moderate choices over expenditures, fees, contracting, and 
targeting. In all these countries, local governments were given some administrative 
authority, but central imposition of salaries seemed to be detrimental to the decision-
making process.        
Decentralization in health services has reached, in some countries, the hospital 
level. Although there is not yet hard evidence about the effects of greater hospital 
autonomy on hospital outputs and performance, case studies and survey-based evaluation 
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have shed some light on this policy (Sengooba et al. 2002). For the case of Argentina, 
Gonzales Prieto (2003) examines changes in hospital performance and local 
accountability as a result of decentralization and autonomy granted to hospitals. His 
results show that greater hospital autonomy has brought about more accountability in 
health care responsibilities. However, this study did not find a strong positive effect of 
decentralization and hospital autonomy on hospital performance. 
7
  In order to evaluate 
the effects of greater autonomy on hospital performance and quality of service provided,  
Sengooba et al. (2002) examined the differences between public hospitals and Private 
Non-For Profit (PNFP) hospitals in 3 districts in Uganda
8
. This study found that public 
hospitals consistently had worse performance and drug availability compared to PNFP 
hospitals.   
In the case of the Philippines, Jack (2002) argues if increased administrative 
responsibility is not accompanied by adequate funding, decentralization may even 
deteriorate service delivery quality.   From these results it can be implied that 
administrative decentralization (or any other dimension of decentralization) by itself may 
not be sufficient to generate the expected benefits. Furthermore, this observation supports 
the argument that each dimension of fiscal decentralization can not be analyzed 
independently of the others.  Along similar lines of reasoning, using data from Brazilian 
municipalities, Mobarak et al (2006) find that administrative decentralization only 
provides good results when it is accompanied by good governance.  
                                                 
7
 Although a positive and significant relationship was not found for the whole sample of 90 hospitals 
evaluated, when the author grouped the hospitals according to the level of autonomy, the group of hospitals 
with higher autonomy reported considerable higher performance indicators compared to the rest.  
 
8
 Hospital performance is evaluated through different indicators such as patient workload per doctor and 
cost and expenditures per patient. To account for quality of the service delivery of hospital they use factors 
such as drug stocks, availability of equipment and doctors, and patients satisfaction with the quality of 
health care received.   
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Political decentralization in the health sector  
It is commonly argued that political decentralization brings accountability to the 
system and may improve health service delivery (World Development Report 2004). This 
may occur because citizens have a channel to provide input on local decision-making 
processes and hold local decision-makers accountable for their actions (Khemani 2006). 
McGreevey (2000) argues that political decentralization, in the context of a decentralized 
provision of health services, is essential to ensure accountability and improvements in 
efficiency. He argues that the realization of the benefits of decentralization requires not 
only devolving financial resources and administrative functions to lower tiers of 
government but also instituting electoral accountability.  
Thus, in improving local accountability in service delivery through the political 
process, local elections may be a powerful tool for citizens. Betancourt and Gleason 
(1999), for example, found that in India an increased allocation of nurses to rural districts 
is associated with higher turnout in local elections. Khemani (2001) found that voters in 
local elections reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for the lack 
of it and for increased local inequality in their tenure. More interestingly, this research 
finds that this voting behavior at the local level is more consistent over time than the 
voting behavior in national elections.  These studies highlight the importance of local 
accountability mechanisms, including political decentralization, in improving service 
delivery.   
Another rationale is that political decentralization allows for a more widespread 
political representation (Neven 2003), that is, bringing more diverse and often 
underrepresented groups to participate in decision making about health services. There is 
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evidence that this has happened in countries such as Pakistan and India, where people of 
traditionally excluded and vulnerable groups, such as women, farmers in rural areas and 
indigenous people, now have a role in the political process (World Bank 2005; 
Raghabendra and Dulfo 2003). In these two countries women and other groups have 
reserved seats in the legislative bodies of local governments, as a consequence of the 
political decentralization process. Furthermore, the participation of these groups has 
already created an impact on how much local governments spend in services such as 
health. In India, for example, Raghabendra and Dulfo (2003) found that higher 
participation of women in local governments, through the reserved seats, is associated 
with a shift in public spending on health care and water provision. While the findings of 
Raghabendra and Dulfo (2003) highlight the impact of a complex process of local 
political representation, they nevertheless help to support the argument that widespread 
political representation would not be possible without political decentralization as a first 
step.   
One of the few existing empirical studies on the effects of political 
decentralization and health across countries, Khaleghian (2003), evaluates the impact of 
political decentralization on immunization rates using a panel time-series data set of 140 
low- and middle-income countries from 1980 to 1997. He finds that in the low-income 
group, increased decentralization is associated with higher coverage.   
Decentralization and its effects on the water provision sector: arguments and 
evidence. 
  
Water is increasingly being managed as an economic rather than a social good, 
and decentralization in its various forms may be a useful tool to support this new 
approach (Braadbaart and Schwartz 2000).  Governments and other reformers are now 
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trying to link service levels and costs, provide incentives to increase the efficiency of 
water resource allocation, reduce costs, and increase sustainability of water service 
systems (Lorrain 1992). In theory, decentralized water services should improve 
governments’ ability to treat water as an economic good. Moreover, as argued throughout 
this section, a locally accountable provision scheme would help impose user charges that 
could create incentives for efficient water use as well as for a self financed water 
provision.  
 Fiscal decentralization and water provision       
 The argument often made that lower-level governments, closer to the 
beneficiaries, have an advantage in identifying citizens’ preferences as well as the 
flexibility to respond to local conditions seems also to be common in the literature on 
water provision (Mclean 2001). As local governments use this information to improve 
access, reliability, and higher quality of water, consumers may be willing to pay more for 
services (Ahmad 2002). These increased user charges can, in turn, be used to finance 
expansion, improvement, and maintenance of the existing network (Lorrain 1992). 
Indeed, as Bahl and Linn (1992) argued, the provision of services by municipal 
governments or other local bodies can be enhanced by the use of revenues raised as user 
fees to finance maintenance and even capital expenditures.  
There is not cross country empirical evidence about the effects of decentralization 
on water provision and the country case studies bring mostly descriptive and anecdotal 
experiences. One probable reason for this situation is the lack of data in the field, which 
in turn is caused by difficulties in measuring the availability, access, and quality of this 
service. Descriptive evidence from new decentralized approaches points towards the 
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theory that users are willing to pay for water services if they are tailored to and fulfill 
their needs. A 1993 World Bank study found this to be true across different income 
levels. This study showed that low income households in marginal urban areas are willing 
to pay higher tariffs, if they would obtain an improved access to the service in return. 
This may be explained by the fact that lower income groups without household 
connection to water are currently paying higher prices for water than higher income 
groups in the same countries (with household water connection) (World Development 
Report 2004). 
Although large capital investments are usually financed by central or ministerial 
branches, user charges are increasingly common for operations and maintenance of 
feeder systems (Ahmad 2002).   The WDR (2004) argues that fiscal decentralization may 
allow local governments to charge for water services, which in turn can enhance the local 
policy makers’ accountability to citizens. On the opposite case, without access to enough 
revenues from the clients, the service provider depends on the policymakers for fiscal 
resources to maintain service provision and in this way the local accountability may be 
harmed (WDR 2004). In many countries where water provision services depend on 
transfers from the central government there is lack of predictability on the amount and 
timeliness of the funding. This situation leaves the provider short in financial resources, 
which may lead to a vicious cycle of lower quantity and quality of services and even 
lower local revenues (Ahmad 2002).  But the opposite is also argued: Zamman (2002), 
based on a case study of Indonesia, states that own-funded providers, especially if they 
have private management, do not commonly have good results and face opposition from 
local consumers and unions.  
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Administrative decentralization and water provision   
  Following the classification of the types of administrative decentralization made 
by Rondinelli (1981) explained earlier, we can disaggregate water provision into de-
concentrated, delegated and devolved schemes. According to Evans (2003), the de-
concentrated system of water provision is the most common in the least developed 
countries. A common approach is to locate staff from the corresponding ministerial 
branch in units at intermediate and local governments to be responsible for water services 
delivery. The units develop their operation based mainly on technical considerations such 
as viability of the water source rather than identifying specific the needs of the population 
served. Not surprisingly, this approach created few incentives for users to financially 
assist government in maintaining or financing water services (Ahmad 1996). 
 Under the delegation model, governments transfer water management to public 
or even semi-private (public private partnerships) water agencies or management 
companies. These agencies are responsible for providing services within a specified 
region and are accountable to central ministerial branches.  In the devolution approach, 
urban and rural units of water supply are fully placed under local tutelage.  According to 
the Ahmad (1996), the degree of responsibilities may vary according to the local 
government administrative capacity. When local governments are more skilled, they can 
undertake activities that range from very technical in nature to activities related to 
community involvement.  Local governments that lack technical capacity can still interact 
with the communities while relying on staff from higher tiers of government for technical 
support.  Most of the literature on this point out that whatever approach is taken would 
work differently (more or less successfully) depending on country characteristics and 
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institutional settings. Rosenweig and Perez (1999) argue that each country is sufficiently 
different so that the solutions and option for water provision will not be the same.    
Again, cross country empirical evidence is very scarce on this topic. Bardhan 
(2002) found some evidence about the relationship of administrative decentralization and 
water services. He analyzes 121 completed rural water supply projects, financed by 
various international donor agencies in several countries.  His results showed that 
projects with high participation of local communities in project selection and design were 
much more likely to have the water supply maintained in good condition. In other words, 
projects with more decentralized decision making were more likely to be sustainable than 
projects with centralized decision-making.   
  More abundant is the single-country based literature that looks at this 
relationship. In Uganda, water provision projects with bottom-up planning and 
empowerment of communities were implemented improving local ownership and 
enhancing sustainability (USAID 2001).  In Mexico, after the government transferred the 
management of irrigation systems to users’ associations, recovery of costs increased from 
30 percent to about 80 percent (Water and Sanitation Program- World Bank 2003). In 
Egypt, cropping intensity almost doubled after farmer-managed irrigation systems were 
introduced (Water and Sanitation Program- World Bank 2003). There is more anecdotal 
evidence of success from Ghana, Benin, Ecuador, Bolivia, India, and South Africa, 
particularly in extending the access of the service to relatively secluded rural areas 
(Castillo 1998).   
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Political decentralization and water provision   
 Koppel (1987) argued that user participation and political accountability through 
this participation is essential for the performance and sustainability of water programs. 
As in the case of fiscal and administrative decentralization of water provision the existing 
evidence is mainly descriptive and anecdotal. Based on a case study of Indonesia, 
Zamaan (2002) argues that water provision can be cheaper and more efficient if water 
providers are managed with the active engagement of local stakeholders (i.e., water 
provision cooperatives, consumers, and elected representatives). Moreover, he argues that 
under this type of scheme, providers are held accountable to consumers and elected 
representatives. He concludes that better service provision would have a better chance to 
occur where representatives are democratically elected and structures are in place for 
citizen-initiated accountability. 
An interesting example of citizen engagement in service delivery in 
democratically elected local governments is the case of the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil. 
In this city, citizens and neighborhood associations of different regions participate in the 
city’s assembly meetings to discuss with locally elected politicians the local budget 
allocation for each different service, specific needs of the different districts, and even 
implementation issues. These joint politician-citizen discussions have generated 
impressive results. Between 1989 and 1996 access to basic sanitation (water and sewage) 
nearly doubled, while increasing revenue collection by 48 per cent (Santos 1998). This 
also highlights the willingness of citizens to pay for services if the services they need are 
in fact delivered.  
  27 
Other factors to consider when looking at the relationship between decentralization 
and service delivery   
Governance aspects such as corruption and citizen participation in decision-
making have been evaluated as the cause of a variety of socio economic outcomes 
including significant variance in service delivery outcomes.  However, these variables 
seem to be ignored in most of the literature that evaluates the impact of decentralization 
on service delivery. Only a few studies like Khaleghian (2003), which has a variable for 
political rights in the local governments, consider this type of constraining factors
9
.      
Corruption 
 Administrative corruption can be profoundly damaging to the quantity and 
quality of service delivery across these key sectors. Corruption is often deeply rooted in 
public administration and leads providers of services to have unethical behaviors. The 
health sector, for instance, is characterized by a deep interdependence of providers and 
clients (Pritchet 1996). In this relationship there are factors like asymmetric information, 
divergence between public and private interests and incentives, and other characteristics 
that provide fertile ground for corruption (Lewis 1999). Patients, especially the poor, are 
in a distinctively weak position to counter these difficulties (WDR  2004).  
Kaufman et al. (1999) argue that governance factors such as corruption and infant 
mortality rates have a strong negative correlation. Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson 
(1999) also find that countries with higher levels of corruption tend to have higher child 
and infant mortality rates than countries with lower indexes of corruption. Rajkumar and 
Swaroop (2002) evaluate the links between public spending, governance, and service 
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 See also Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002), which considers corruption in evaluating sector expenditures and 
education outcomes. 
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outcomes. Using data from a cross-section of countries for two periods of time, they 
found that increasing public spending on primary education is likely to be more effective 
in increasing primary education attainment but only in an environment where governance 
(e.g., control of corruption) also improves. One of the main variables to measure good 
governance was the level of corruption. This study clearly frames the questions of public 
spending and its effect on education attainment on governance issues. Based on survey 
data of health care users and health facilities across 105 urban and rural municipalities in 
Bolivia, Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman (2002) examined the determinants of 
corruption and citizen participation in health services. They found that corruption was 
significantly associated with longer waiting time to obtain medical care.   
 Another important issue to consider in corruption is the likelihood of capture by 
interest groups, particularly in poor countries (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000a). That is, 
while local governments may have better local information and generate better 
accountability, they may be more vulnerable to capture by local elites, who will then 
receive a disproportionate share of sub-national spending on public goods adjusted to 
their preferences (Bardhan 2001). Evidence from country experiences signals that this is 
likely to happen in sub-national governments where civic participation is low (Shah 
2002).    
Voice and Citizen Participation for Greater Accountability 
As Gatti, Gray-Molina, Klugman (2003) argue, citizen participation in the public 
policy debate is envisaged as a mechanism to bring more accountability and transparency 
to the decision making, particularly at the local level. Aside from voting out politicians 
(in the context of political decentralization) citizens can address their disapproval of 
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public services by protesting (e.g., through the media or citizens’ organizations), through 
involvement in political affairs, or by finding alternative sources of supply. Thus, citizen 
and civil society organizations involvement in decisions about how public money is 
budgeted and spent at the sub-national level has been proposed as a very important tool 
for accountability. 
10
 The channels for this participation include the traditional civic 
involvement in political affairs (i.e., electoral participation), freedom of speech, political 
rights, the formation of civic groups, and the use of the media (Kaufmann et al. 2003).    
There is growing country-case based evidence about the effects of citizen 
participation resulting in improvements in service delivery within the context of 
decentralization. In Mexico, over 22,000 health committees were created by 1998 to 
oversee health provision and participate in health campaigns and training with positive 
initial results (World Bank 1999).   Evidence from Colombia and Bolivia show that 
citizens/constituents oversight can be a force in pushing local governments to improve 
their capacity and responsiveness (Faguet 2000; 2005). Thus, regular and clean elections, 
and citizen participation can increase the pressure on local leaders to turn citizens’ 
demands into outputs. Indeed, civic engagement can importantly influence how 
governments allocate resources, especially if local government budget information is 
available and disseminated to citizens (Keefer and Khemani 2004).  
The city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, for example, is a widely cited example of how 
civic involvement in budgeting can enhance resource allocation as well as contribute to 
democratic governance. In this city, budgets are of public domain and informal 
preparatory meetings are held to discuss demands of various community associations 
(unions, cooperatives, mothers’ clubs, etc.) for investment across service sectors and total 
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budget availability (Santos 1998; World Bank 2001). These demands are then ranked and 
aggregated for budget allocation by needs and population size. Since 1989, the workers 
party has won three consecutive municipal elections in Porto Alegre. Between 1989 and 
1996, the percentage of households with access to water services and municipal sewage 
system rose from 80 percent to 98 percent and from 46 to 85 percent, respectively. 
During the same period, the number of children enrolled in public schools doubled and 
city revenues increased by nearly 50 percent. 
11
 In this case, the level of participation 
extends beyond information sharing and consultation. Citizens and civil society 
organizations propose spending projects, set priorities, and help decide which projects 
should be funded. There appears to be a direct link between increased civic participation 
in municipal budgeting and service delivery outcomes, including increases in 
infrastructure investment and education expenditures in poor areas (WDR 2004). Citizen 
participation guarantees legitimacy to decisions, and objective budgeting ensures a higher 
degree of fairness in an otherwise arbitrary process that it always subject to local elite 
capture.    
There is also some empirical evidence about the influence of citizen and 
community participation in improving accountability and service delivery. In a study of 
Bolivia’s citizen participation under a newly decentralized system of health care service 
provision, Gray-Molina et al. (1999) found that informal payments and longer wait times 
for service in municipal health providers, were less prevalent in cities and towns where 
local citizens participated in health boards. A follow up study on the former developed by 
Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman (2003) found that wait times for medical treatment and 
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informal payments in the health sector were reduced were OTBs, the grass root 
organizations created by the decentralization law, were more active.
12
  This later study 
also found that exit options (i.e., private health care facilities) do not help to reduce the 
situation of informal payments and waiting times for medical treatment.  Also in Bolivia, 
Kaufmann et al. (2002) based on a survey of central and local government agencies found 
that citizen’s voice and participation variables were statistically significant in improving 
public sector performance
13
. Moreover, they found that citizen voice was more important 
for government performance in delivering services than public management tools such as 
higher salaries or rule enforcement. This may be evidence to support Dillinger’s (1995) 
statement about urban service delivery; he argued that public service delivery 
performance seemed an issue that hardly could be addressed only through the 
organizational context. Rather, this issue should be addressed by observing and taking 
into account other factors that affect the relationships between governments and their 
constituencies.    
Conclusion  
This chapter discussed in a focused manner the literature that articulates the 
linkages between decentralization policy and public service delivery, particularly for 
services such health care and water provision. Moreover, it highlighted the studies that 
provide some evidence of the impact of decentralization (through each of its dimensions, 
namely fiscal, administrative, and political) on different aspects of public service 
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 OTBs or Organizaciones Territoriales de Base were created by the Decentralization Law of Bolivia (Ley 
de Participación Popular) as the grass roots committees in charge of communicating the voice and the 
desires of the communities to their local governments regarding how the budget should be spent. Gatti et al. 
(2003) found no significant correlation between voter turnout or the number of OTB and informal 
payments and wait times. However, there was an effect when OTB were active in their local governments.   
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 Citizen’s voice was measured through variables such as the existence of clearly defined mechanisms to 
ask users about their needs and preferences; and the existence of mechanisms to address users’ complaints, 
among others.  
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delivery, including quantity and quality of services. However, this focused review also 
showed that only fewer studies provide cross-country examination of the effects of this 
policy on public services, which enables the evaluation of the effect of different levels 
decentralization.  Moreover, the discussion in this chapter captured the rather fragmented 
treatment of the decentralization process in the literature, that is, the evaluation of the 
effects of decentralization (on socio economic variables) looking at a single dimension of 
this policy. The next chapter articulates the case for looking at decentralization in a more 
comprehensive way and discusses the basis of a framework to examine this policy and its 
effects on service delivery.   
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CHAPTER 3 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND SERVICE DELIVERY 
This chapter provides a framework of the relationship between decentralization 
and service delivery by discussing selected aspects of this relationship, and by examining 
the process and implications of providing services at the local level. This chapter also 
serves as a preamble to the empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 4, by informing the 
construction of empirical models that involve the analysis of decentralization reforms.  
This chapter is organized as follows: first it discusses the causes of 
decentralization as a way to examine issues such as exogeneity in the models that contain 
this reform as an explanatory variable; then it discusses the relevance of the three core 
dimensions of the decentralization process (i.e., fiscal, administrative and political) in 
evaluating the depth of this reform; and finally it discusses a simple framework to 
examine service delivery in the local context.   
 Why are decentralization reforms initiated? 
Decentralization processes are often initiated for and driven by political factors 
rather than with the objective of improving economic efficiency. These political factors 
are commonly related to a country’s population and institutional characteristics and 
legacies. This argument has been discussed extensively and is widely acknowledged, and 
while it is not the central issue of this research, it is important to briefly discuss it because 
understanding why decentralization processes were initiated helps to grasp the context in 
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which this policy interacts with (and affects) other economic, social, and institutional 
variables.  
Moreover, understanding why decentralization reform is initiated is also essential 
for constructing econometric models to evaluate empirically the effects of this reform. 
For example, considerations about causality in the relationships examined can be first 
approached by understanding properly the origins and triggers of the evaluated reforms in 
the right hand side of the regression.   
The literature of fiscal federalism of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s already 
recognized that decentralization processes were prompted by political considerations and 
historical legacies (Oates 1972). In many federations (e.g., United States, India, and 
Germany) colonies and strong self- acknowledged jurisdictions existed before the 
countries themselves existed. Thus, maintaining or re-initiating decentralization processes 
was a way to hold together nations within a larger nation. Similarly, even in some unitary 
countries in Western Europe, historical legacies fostered a system with decentralized 
authorities: Spain, for example, is an agglutination of kingdoms and territories, and the 
historical legacies embedded in this situation are central for understanding the demands 
for decentralization in this country (Lopez-Laborda, Martinez-Vazquez, and Monasterio 
2006). 
 Powerful triggers for decentralization are regional, cultural, ethnic, and religious 
tensions often seen within developing countries but also in transition and developed 
countries (Fox and Wallich 1997; Van Houten et al 1993; Leon 2001).   Bird (2003), for 
example states the following: “Canada, Russia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Macedonia, 
Switzerland, South Africa, China, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Spain, Uganda, the 
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Philippines, Tanzania, India, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Turkey, 
Serbia, Algeria, Sudan, Moldova, Morocco, Cameroon, even France…What can such a 
diverse set of countries (and many others) have in common? The answer is that each 
contains within its boundaries a significant territorially-based group of people who are (or 
consider themselves to be) distinct and different – in ethnicity, in language, in religion, or 
just in history….” (pp. 1).  
In many countries of Africa, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific, those 
regional conflicts along ethnic, linguistic, or religion lines frequently induce powerful 
demands for greater autonomy.  In the most extreme cases, where conflicts and 
grievances are so strong that they threaten peace and the existence of the country as such, 
relinquishing some powers from the center to the regions is seen as one of the few 
solutions for stability and peace. In those extreme cases, Posen (2003) argues that people 
feel that only a decentralized (or federal) structure may insulate ethnic groups from 
predatory (ethnic) politics. Overall, under lower and higher level of regional tensions, the 
decentralization process itself is seen by leaders, politicians, and external stakeholders as 
a tool for stabilizing and attempting to resolve those political demands and grievances.   
In the Latin American context, while some argued that structural reforms of the 
1980’s and early 1990’s reduced the role of central government and consequently 
prompted decentralization (Ames 1999), the reality is that in most countries 
decentralization reforms ran almost parallel to (and in some cases ahead of) core 
structural reforms. The same is true for many transition economies in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. A number of scholars have also suggested that decentralization presented 
an avenue to pass-down fiscal deficits, and this is indeed factually true, but that was not 
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the prime reason for starting the reform process (Bird and Vaillancourt 1998; see also 
Wallich 1994).  Rather, and as Montero and Samuels (2004) find after exhaustive country 
case studies in Latin American countries, political choices played a major role in 
prompting decentralization. Case by case, the research of these authors show that it is 
either an ―electoralist‖ goal (where political parties initiate decentralization to 
reinvigorate or improve their political bases) or regional pressures and tensions 
(originated by historical legacies) and in some cases both, that induce the initiation (or re-
initiation) of a decentralization reform.  These authors conclude that there is little 
evidence that promoting efficiency was the objective behind decentralization reforms in 
Latin America.  
In post-socialist countries, democratization and devolution of some fiscal, 
administrative, and political power seems the most plausible reason for initiating 
decentralization during the transition period. The collapse of the socialist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, for example, came with strong hopes of redistributing power 
that was so highly concentrated previously. Illner (1999), in a study examining the 
transfer of power of local government across Central and Eastern Europe argues that 
government decentralized some functions and resources after the transition in order to 
support their legitimacy in the midst of the political instability. He also argues that 
decentralization served as an emblem of the widely hoped democratization.  
With focus on the relationship between decentralization and service delivery 
Treisman (2002) argues that: ―It is hard to see how the rate of infant inoculations, the 
availability of improved water sources, sanitation facilities, or essential drugs, or the 
youth illiteracy rate could themselves affect decentralization, except perhaps via their 
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effect on national income.‖  But a counterpoint could be inferred, to some extent, from 
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) when responding to the question of ―why 
decentralization‖ they argue that ―decentralization is usually introduced as a policy to 
offset a problem that has caused dissatisfaction with the present system of governance.‖ 
These authors note that further pressures for decentralization may be increased when 
citizens are dissatisfied by the performance of the government, and one could infer that 
performance of government also includes the performance of public services it delivers.     
The Relevance of the Three Dimensions of Decentralization 
  As discussed earlier, the decentralization process has three main dimensions: 
fiscal, administrative, and political. Due to limited data availability, the empirical 
literature has mainly focused on the first dimension and has used that aspect as proxy for 
the overall process.  Moreover, many studies focusing on fiscal decentralization seem to 
overlook the fact that the political and administrative aspects of the process are 
intrinsically related to the fiscal one, and do not even comment about these inter-linkages 
while drawing conclusions from their empirical analyses.  This omission in empirical 
examinations might be leading to biased results.  See also Appendix A for a detailed 
discussion on assessing properly fiscal decentralization, and the difficulties of measuring 
properly this multi-faced dimension of the decentralization in the context of a multi-
dimensional reform.    
Accounting for all three dimensions of decentralization in an empirical model is 
critical for the several reasons. First, each individual dimension of decentralization is 
likely to have an individual effect on the dependent variable, and thus omitting one 
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dimension might overstate the effect of the dimension of decentralization actually used or 
underestimate the effect of the decentralization reform as whole.  
Second, oftentimes one dimension decentralizes faster and deeper than the others. 
Furthermore, sometimes one of the dimensions might not experience any decentralization 
at all. This situation has consequences on the effects that the overall decentralization 
reform may have on any given socio-economic or institutional variable. This is a 
widespread occurrence in most countries with this reform, but it is particularly common 
in developing and transition economies. For example, in Poland, administrative and 
political decentralization were initiated with a ―big bang‖ approach with the purpose of 
spreading democracy and democratic values in the early years of the transition but 
finances still do not match the same level of administrative and political responsibilities 
and consequently local governments are still struggling to cope with overwhelming 
financial mandates (Regulski 2003). In Bolivia, municipal governments increasingly have 
more autonomy over a larger amount of financial resources; however, all the 
administrative decisions regarding personnel are taken still at the central level (World 
Bank 2005).  Pakistan has recently experienced an important reform regarding political 
and administrative devolution.
14
 However, its sub-national governments remain fiscally 
dependent on the federal government
15
 (World Bank 2005). In each of the examples 
provided, the overall effect of decentralization reforms would depend on the cumulative 
effect generated by each individual dimension.         
                                                 
14
 Administrative devolution is particularly significant at the provincial level. However, from the provincial 
to the local levels there are still different degrees of administrative decentralization. In many cases 
provinces have kept much of the administrative decision making (World Bank 2005). 
 
15
 Local governments are heavily dependent on the provincial governments through which transfers from 
the center flow downwards (World Bank 2005).  
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Third, cross-country comparisons countries from a single decentralization 
perspective present important caveats. Indeed, considering the mismatches described 
earlier one wonders how two countries can be compared in terms of decentralization from 
only one dimension. In the examples above, how can it be argued that Poland is more 
decentralized than Bolivia or that Pakistan is more centralized than Poland? Considering 
only one dimension is like analyzing only one third of the picture.    
Fourth, the interaction or inter-linkages between two dimensions (or more) 
dimensions of decentralization could generate an additional or ―extra‖ effect on given 
dependent variable; in other words, the whole can be larger than the sum of the parts. 
This effect may be the result of mutually reinforcing aspects of the decentralization 
dimensions. For example, it could be argued that higher local fiscal autonomy (i.e., 
higher fiscal decentralization) could generate additional positive results on local service 
delivery (that is, more efficiency due to a better match of public spending with local 
needs) when administrative decentralization grants power to local governments on 
decision-making over personnel delivering those services, or when political 
decentralization pushes local officials to be accountable to local needs on public local 
spending. That is, while each dimension of decentralization reform might have an 
independent effect in its own right, the reinforcing aspects of having more than one 
dimension could produce an additional value.  
These reasons for accounting for all dimensions of decentralization are obviously 
interconnected and at the end they amount to one key argument: the threat of model 
misspecification and the potential of misleading results.  
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A Simple Framework 
This section provides a basic framework to examine the relationship between 
decentralization and service delivery by discussing selected aspects of this relationship 
and by examining the process of providing services at the local level. This discussion also 
aims to inform the construction of the empirical models used in Chapter 4 of this study.    
The Choice of Dependent Variable: Outputs (Access) vis a vis Final Outcomes In Service 
Delivery     
Most of the cross-country research conducted on the effects of different 
institutional reforms on service delivery evaluate the impact of the institutional reform (i) 
on a final outcome of a public service (fo) (for example infant mortality rates or 
education performance), assuming broadly the following function:  
),,(
sjsjsjsj
cieffo   (3.1) 
Where 
sj
e   represents expenditures in service s, within country j and 
sj
i  is 
typically measured as a discrete variable to quantify the presence of institutional reform; 
sj
c   is a set of control variables that may also have an effect on fo.   
The key problem examining service outcomes is that the function above (3.1), or 
any function framing the relationship of an institutional reform (including 
decentralization) and final outcomes of service delivery, is that it can not realistically 
contain all the relevant variables that may impact significantly a final outcome (fo). 
Demographic factors, geographic and weather conditions, political environment, and 
cultural issues, all need to be considered. More importantly the quantity and quality of 
other public (or private services) can have a large impact as well. For example, infant 
mortality rates may be impacted by poor health condition in mothers, which is caused by 
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the lack of access to water provision and the quality of water consumed. Infant mortality 
rates may also be affected by a large concentration of mosquitoes under poor sanitary 
conditions which exacerbates malaria prevalence rates in mothers and other care giver, or 
by the lack of education of parents, which is an impediment for them to take 
precautionary measurements in their children health. In the case of education, better 
nutrition and better health care may help children to achieve better results at school 
(WDR 2004). Household income, cultural factors, and parents’ level of education may 
affect student completion rates and performance in standardized tests, and so on (Fuchs 
and Woessmann 2004).  
Moreover, all these independent factors may be interacting at the same time in 
ways we do not fully understand. Uphoff (1992), for example, argues that the effects of 
government policies in service delivery are subject to many uncontrollable external and 
cross-sectoral influences and thus final outcomes are usually a fuzzy indicator of specific 
service problems and achievements. Thus, while recognizing that complete of full model 
specification is virtually impossible, all these omitted (and unobserved) factors, spurious 
effects, and interactions make the examination of institutional reforms (such as 
decentralization) and final service outcomes very difficult, leaving ample space for under 
or over statement and spurious effects and attribution problems.  
Therefore, a better aim is to step back and provide a more robust and direct 
approach to evaluate the effects of decentralization reform on service delivery. This study 
proposes the use of intermediate outputs, namely variables that measure access to 
services, rather than final outcomes, so the effect is more direct. In most countries, 
intermediate outputs and access are at the center of the problems with public service 
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delivery.  In the case of health care, intermediate outputs (or access variables) are 
basically availability of doctors, access to medical facilities and medical personnel to 
receive basic health care services, and immunization treatment coverage, among others. 
In the case of water provision, an intermediate output is access to improved sources of 
drinking water, through household connection to running water or other nearby reliable 
access to drinking water.  
 A Traditional Service Delivery Structure    
A graphic scheme of service delivery can also lend itself to illustrate the influence 
of decentralization reform in outputs of service delivery. Figure 3.1 shows a pipeline in 
the production of a specific service s (in this case health care). This figure succinctly 
shows the upstream pipeline of delivering a service, which starts with inputs such as 
financing, management, and decision making (including political power to do so) in 
setting the service delivery platform. These inputs allow the production of a service by 
paying salaries for doctors and nurses (and other relevant personnel), purchasing needed 
supplies for treatments, providing maintenance, acquiring medical equipment, and 
improving facilities.  
These initial outputs, in turn, help directly in the production of some intermediate 
outputs of the service that are closely related to access such as immunization coverage, 
access to birth delivery services, maternal care, etc. At the end of the pipeline this should 
lead to outcomes related to improved health status for the population such as lower rates 
of infant mortality (as shown in the example of Figure 3.1). But (as argued earlier in this 
section) this latter step in not fully a direct consequence of a proper production of a 
specific service or health program because there are a number of variables also affecting 
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that final outcome that are related to health care provision itself (see Figure 3.1).  Note 
that the basic production of a service could take place in a centralized or decentralized 
framework, but this study would move to that discussion later in this chapter.    
 Source: Author based on modified service program structures from WHO and the World Bank 
 
Figure 3.1: A service delivery pipeline: The case of health care 
 
A traditional Service Delivery Structure, Decentralization and Key Considerations     
Building on the last sub-section, Figure 3.2 connects decentralization reform to 
the initial inputs of the traditional way to look at the delivery pipeline of a service (shown 
in Figure 3.1). While, Figure 3.2 is not a representation of service delivery in a 
decentralized context (which is addressed later in this chapter) but rather introduces the 
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idea that each of the key initial inputs to produce services can be significantly influenced 
by the three dimensions of decentralization reform.  
Indeed, fiscal decentralization can change the way in which financial resources 
are allocated across service sectors and within sectors, with potential implication to the 
levels of technical and allocative efficiency (as discussed in Chapter 2). Administrative 
decentralization can change how staffing and other supply side resources are re-allocated 
to increase or decrease the size of a specific service in each sector. Finally, political 
decentralization has the potential to increase accountability by improving responsiveness 
and responsibility of officials, bureaucrats, and service providers. The importance of the 
multidimensional approach to evaluate the effects of decentralization on service delivery 
and other socio-economic variables is further discussed below. 
There are, however, key considerations regarding service provision in a 
decentralized framework that need to be discussed up front. In most countries, local 
governments have a role in delivering key services. When setting the expenditure 
responsibilities among levels of local government, a number of aspects and questions 
need to be examined. For example, what is the balance between economies of scale in 
providing a service s (that is, to help achieving technical efficiencies in service s) and 
properly tailoring services to local needs (that is, allocative efficiency)? Other critical 
questions are: what is the right size of local government in a particular country to produce 
service s? what is the local government capacity to produce and manage effectively and 
efficiently service s? what are the externalities of such provision across jurisdictions? 
What are the national priorities in specific sector and service (See Beasley and Coate 
2003; Bird et al. 2003;  Lockwood 2002)  
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Source: Author based on a modified service program structure from WHO and the World Bank. 
Figure 3.2: Decentralization and Its Effect on Inputs on a Traditional Service 
Delivery Pipeline 
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The answers to these, and other questions, would help policy makers to decide at 
what level of government a specific service should be provided. Each specific service is 
likely to require a different level of government for its delivery. For example, primary 
health care requires immediate proximity to the patients and delivers less specialized 
health care services, and thus, it might be located at the smallest size of local government, 
secondary and tertiary health care, which have a higher level of specialization in 
treatments might need an intermediate or higher level of government to allow enough 
resources and serve with economies of scale to a larger population group. This situation 
further challenges our ability to model service delivery in a decentralized context.   
  
Service Delivery and the Multidimensional Decentralization Reform Context   
The vast majority of the research related to decentralization and service delivery 
focus on a single dimension of this reform. Expanding on the function 3.1 and assuming a 
symmetric level of decentralization across jurisdictions in a country, consider the 
following function: 
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Where ao is an intermediate output of (or a measure of access to) service s in 
country j; F represents public budget resources devoted to service s; A represents 
administrative or managerial powers in handling the delivery of service s; P represents 
broad political and legislative powers in the country; and c accounts for variables that 
shape the economic and institutional context of country j.  In the case of financing 
resources, L can be interpreted as the local share of financing (F) (that is, 10 
Fj
L ) 
over which a local government has fiscal autonomy or strong discretion either in how 
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resources are collected or in how they are spent (Appendix A provides a detailed 
discussion of how to assess fiscal autonomy at the country level).  Note that a local 
government may have specific financing sources to cover a specific service s, or it may 
have a broad allocation of resources (from different sources) to cover a mandated basket 
of various services, or as in most countries, a mix of both. Thus, the function 3.2 is a 
generalization. In the econometric models presented in Chapter 4  








sj
sjFsj
F
FL
 is called 
fiscal decentralization or FD (Appendix A also introduces some of the challenges 
measuring fiscal decentralization due to its multi-faced structure and the complexities 
that may be involved in its design). In the case of administrative decision-making powers 
(A), L denotes one or several key administrative power that allow local governments 
more autonomy and flexibility is deciding over staffing, resources, and levels of 
provisions that match their needs in service s. Commonly, 




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


sj
sjAsj
A
AL
 can be sector 
specific (e.g., administrative decisions of staffing in health care for an specific service 
assigned to a local government) or functional (e.g., staffing decision across all 
responsibilities assigned to a local government); in the econometric models presented in 
Chapter 4  this is called administrative decentralization or AD . In the case of political 
power (P), L simply denotes a key element that would allow local political power and 
consequently certain level of local political accountability; such as having locally elected 
leaders that would consider local preferences (of their constituents) to shape service 
delivery policy accordingly. in the econometric models presented in Chapter 4  this is 
called political decentralization or PD 
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Additionally, the control variables c for country j could be further sub-divided 
into two groups: (i) specific economic conditions and country characteristics; and (ii) 
institutional characteristics that may influence service delivery outputs such as the level 
of corruption and the level of citizen participation to enhance accountability.   
Relationship of Fiscal, Administrative, and Political Decentralization with Service 
Delivery in Decentralized vis a vis Centralized Frameworks     
Figure 3.3, which is a modification of the service delivery framework used by the 
World Bank’s World Development Report (2004), illustrates accountability relationships 
among the key actors in a centralized vis a vis a decentralized system of service 
provision.   As Ahmad et al. (2005) argue only understanding the relationships between 
central policy makers, local governments, service providers, and citizens policy makers 
can fully understand why decentralization reforms can, and sometimes cannot, lead to 
better service delivery.  
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Source: Author’s modified version of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2004—service 
delivery framework. 
 
Figure 3.3: Accountability lines in more and less decentralized service delivery 
systems.  
 
Moreover, Figure 3.3 illustrates the importance of each dimension of 
decentralization in delivering public services. In this figure, Rondinelly’s (1981) three 
decentralized modes (de-concentration, delegation, and devolution --discussed in chapter 
2) are merged into two: a de-concentration mode, and a mode that goes from delegation 
to devolution. Moreover, these modes of decentralization are aimed to reflect how central 
and local policy makers, service providers, and citizens are inter-linked under the three 
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broad dimensions of decentralization: fiscal, administrative, and political.  For example, 
local governments may have some degree of fiscal decentralization, but if they do not 
have the autonomy to manage its human resources (for example, the ability or hire and 
fired personnel is not an power of the local government but rather one that belongs to a 
central line ministry) they may be unable to tailor services to local preferences in an 
efficient manner.   
Further, if local officials are not democratically elected by their local constituents, 
there could be a weak link of accountability to local citizens, since appointed officials are 
accountable to the center, and thus they may pursue different preferences from those of 
local constituents. On a different case, if political decentralization is in place, but local 
governments do not have the necessary resources or administrative autonomy to take 
decisions, local officials may loss credibility and citizens would not have an incentive to 
pay taxes to be spent on improving local public services.  Thus, theoretical rationales of 
allocative efficiency, technical efficiency, and local knowledge of preferences and needs 
arising from a decentralized framework may suffer as a consequence. 
The accountability relationships shown in Figure 3.3 are central to the theory that 
decentralized frameworks can produce better quantities and quality of services.  If 
authorities performing functions at the local level are not accountable to their 
constituents, at least to some degree, fiscally (through the revenue or expenditure side), 
administratively and politically, the expectation that decentralized provision would lead 
to better services might be partly eroded.   
The relations between central policy makers and citizens vis a vis local policy-
makers and citizens could also be portrayed in the following way: because national 
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constituencies are so large and heterogeneous, they may be unable to hold national 
policy-makers accountable for their very specific preferences; in other words, 
heterogeneous national constituencies might make the process of accountability harder as 
there is much more divergence in their preferences. At the same time, central policy 
makers may not be able (or willing) to address all the different constituencies’ problems 
in a way that satisfies local needs, as they only need to  pursue selected policies to keep 
themselves in power. In a decentralized system of service provision local governments’ 
policy makers are accountable to smaller constituencies, which allows for clearer links 
between a limited number of policies and responsibilities, delivery of those 
responsibilities and results that locally perceived; that is, clearer or more direct 
accountability lines (see Figure 3.3 above).   
Bardham and Moherkee (1998;2000a; 2000b) offer an important caveat in this 
regard. They argue that knowledge of local needs coupled with decentralization powers 
might allow increased efficiency in service delivery but only if local government 
authorities want to use that knowledge for improving services. In the case of ―elite 
capture‖ of local governments, they argue those efficiency gains may not be likely. This 
implies that even locally elected authorities may not deliver the expected quantities and 
quality of services if they instead decide to personally rent from the resources received 
for delivering services.  
This in turn means that a model involving decentralization and service delivery 
should also include some control variables related to institutional environment, for 
example those in Figure 3.3, related to the level of corruption and the level of citizen 
participation in policy making. The level of corruption would be associated with local 
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elites capturing power for rent-seeking purposes, which can change priorities of policy 
making toward privileging small groups as oppose to the majority of the citizens’ needs 
in the jurisdiction.  Moreover, aside from the supply side of accountability, that is, the 
obligation of elected officials to be responsible for delivering public services (Przeworski 
and Stokes, 1999), other means of demand-side accountability may have an influence in 
improving service delivery (Ahmad et al. 2005). Demand-side accountability is basically 
that generated through the power of constituents who elect (and change) periodically their 
leaders, but also refers to citizen participation and opinion in public matters, through free 
media, or through mechanisms such participatory budgeting, published score cards, and 
so on (Ahmed et al 2005, World Bank 2007) 
Conclusion  
The components of a framework to examine the relationship of decentralization 
reform and service delivery discussed above are, to some extent, complex and multi-
faced. But all of them: the multi-dimensional context of decentralization reform, the 
element that pertains to defining what we want to measure in service delivery, and the 
inter-linkages between the actors in decentralized or centralized framework of service 
delivery are extremely relevant to undertake research in this field. Within the context of 
this analytical framework the next chapter attempts an empirical examination of the 
effects of decentralization policy on access to heath care and water provision services. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF 
DECENTRALIZATION AND ACCESS TO SERVICES: THE CASES OF 
HEALTH AND WATER PROVISION 
This chapter examines the effects of decentralization on access to public services using 
cross-country panel data from 1990 to 2002.
16
 More specifically, this chapter evaluates 
the effects of all three dimensions of fiscal decentralization on variables that account for 
access to services in health care and water provision.   
Hypotheses   
Based on the arguments and the framework provided in Chapter 3, the following 
three hypotheses would be tested: (1)  Increased fiscal, political, and administrative 
decentralization have a positive effect on access to health care and improved water 
sources for the population; (2) higher levels of (and changes toward higher) fiscal 
decentralization have a stronger positive effect on access to health care and improved 
water provision for the population in developing countries than in developed countries; 
and (3) the inter-linkages of at least two of the dimensions of decentralization (fiscal, 
administrative, and political), if they are in place in a country, generates an extra positive 
(that is, beyond each individual dimension) effect on access to services of this reform. 
The General Models  
This study evaluates the effects of decentralization on access to health care and 
water provision services.  For hypotheses 1 and 2 the following general regression is 
used:  
                                                 
16
 During this time span, four points in time 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2002 are used due to the data 
characteristics  and availability. 
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Where the dependent variable A  represents a measure of access to health care or 
access to improved drinking water provision services for country i for time t (in the 
subsequent sections AS would be disaggregated into access to health care and water 
provision variables). The independent variables FD, PD, and AD are measures of fiscal, 
political, and administrative decentralization, respectively; these variables are aimed at 
testing Hypothesis 1.  
 Developed countries tend to be more decentralized than developing countries. At 
the same time, developed countries have a higher level of access to services. In regression 
analysis this can depicted by creating a simple dummy for developed countries, which 
would show a higher intercept.  To test hypothesis 2 this analysis takes a step further by 
creating an interaction term between the fiscal decentralization variable and a simple 
dummy generated for developed countries. This interaction term is represented by   (in 
4.1 above), more specifically:  =  * , where   is a representation of the level of 
decentralization (for simplicity using only fiscal decentralization FD) and   is a dummy 
variable that denotes country group as in developed (D)or in transition (T)(former 
socialist block). The purpose of this interaction term   is to examine if changes in   
have different effects on access to services in developed countries compared to 
developing countries, and in transition countries compared to all other countries.  
Additionally,    is the set vector of parameters arising from  , which represents 
a set of control variables that include: (i) country institutional environment such as the 
level of corruption and the availability of channels for citizen participation in policy 
making, (ii) economic conditions and cycles such as per capita GDP and GDP growth, 
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and (iii) country characteristics such population density and population living in rural 
areas;  u  is the error term. 
To test hypothesis 3 the following general regression is used:  
ititititititkit uADPDFDA  
'
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(4.2) 
Where   is an interaction term that contains at least two different dimensions of the 
decentralization process (out of the three FD, PD, and AD). That is, the model tests the 
following interactions combinations: (i) FD*PD; (ii) FD*AD; and (iii) PD*AD 
As discussed in more detail in the next section PD and AD are dummy variables, but 
dummy variables that vary in time. That is, in  t =0,  PD may have a value of zero when a 
measure of political decentralization such as having locally elected leaders is not in place 
but this may change in t=2,3, or 4 . The same situation applies to AD. The dataset spans 
from 1990 through 2002 (using four observations in time for each country), a time frame 
that was very rich in decentralization reforms throughout the world.     
Choice of Variables and Data 
This research uses a cross country unbalanced panel dataset that includes 110 
developing, developed, and transition countries and four points in time for each country 
(1990, 1995, 2000, 2002). The panel is unbalanced because some countries in the dataset 
have missing values for one year for some of the independent variables, which eliminates 
the whole observation under some specifications of the models. The dataset was 
constructed using several data sources briefly described throughout this section.
17
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 See Appendix 1 for a detailed list of all variables (and their sources) used in the empirical analysis.  
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Dependent Variables  
The case made in Chapter 3 as regards to using output and access measures 
related to service provision instead of final outcomes as dependent variables when 
evaluating the effects of decentralization (or any other institutional independent variable) 
was followed in selecting the variables described below.  
In the case health care, the following variables were selected: (i) the percentage of 
births attended in health facilities, (ii) the percentage of births attended by skilled 
(trained) personnel
18
,  and (iii) the immunization coverage for dipththeria, pertussis, 
tetanus (DPT) (in percent). The first two variables listed above measure primary health 
services and provide a good account of relative access to an essential health care service.  
These variables come from the country databases of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) for various years, and the United Nations Millenium Indicators database. The 
third variable is a critical output of preventive health care and also embeds a 
straightforward sense of access. This variable comes from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) produced annually by the World Bank.    
 Table 4.1 below provides a summary of statistics of the dependent variables used 
to account for access to health care services. Additionally, Table 4.2 shows that all the 
selected dependent variables related to health care access are highly (and positively) 
correlated with each other, which allow some flexibility and more option in selecting 
model specifications.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Includes certified midwives. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Access to Health Care Variables  
Dependent Variables  Obs (n) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% of birth attended in health 
facilities 427 0.7130 0.3019 0.01 1
% of birth attended by skilled 
personnel 426 0.7708 0.2815 0.02 1
Inmunization coverage for DPT 
(%) 440 0.8153 0.1838 0.18 1  
 
Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix for Variables Measuring Health Care Access  
% of birth attended in 
health facilities
% of birth attended 
by skilled personnel 
Inmunization 
coverage for DPT (%)
% of birth attended in 
health facilities
1
% of birth attended by 
skilled personnel 
0.9323 1
Inmunization coverage 
for DPT (%)
0.6175 0.6663 1  
 
For the dependent variable that accounts for access to water provision the 
following variables are considered:  (i) the percentage of a country’s population with 
access to improved drinking water sources, (ii) the percentage of a country’s rural 
population with access to improved drinking water sources, and (iii) the percentage of a 
country’s urban population with access to improved drinking water sources. These 
variables come from the United Nations Millenium Indicators database and the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. These sources (as well as WHO) define 
improved drinking water sources ―in terms of the types of technology and levels of 
services that are more likely to provide safer drinking water than unimproved 
technologies. Therefore, improved water sources include household connections, public 
standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collections; 
and unimproved water sources are unprotected wells, unprotected springs, vendor-
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provided water, bottled water (unless water for other uses is available from an improved 
source) and tanker truck-provided water‖. 19   
These variables are the quintessential measures of access in water services. Table 
4.3 below provides a summary of statistics of the dependent variables used to account for 
access water provision. Table 4.4 shows that all the selected dependent variables related 
to access to water provision services are highly and positively correlated. 
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of variables related to access to water services in the 
database  
Dependent Variables  Obs (n) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% of total population with 
access to improved water 
sources 424 0.8218 0.2028 0.2 1
% of rural population with 
access to improved water 
sources 409 0.7378 0.2427 0.1 1
% of urban population with 
access to improved water 
sources 418 0.9158 0.1325 0.32 1  
 
Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix for Variables Measuring Access to Water Provision 
Services 
% of total population 
with access to 
improved water 
sources
% of rural 
population with 
access to improved 
water sources
% of urban population 
with access to 
improved water 
sources
% of total population with 
access to improved 
water sources 1
% of rural population with 
access to improved 
water sources 0.9104 1
% of urban population 
with access to improved 
water sources 0.8368 0.7213 1  
 
                                                 
 
19
 See World Health Organization www.who.org and the United Nations Millenium Indicators database at 
www.un.org 
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Core Independent variables 
As discussed earlier, decentralization is a complex multi-dimensional process that 
involves fiscal, administrative and political aspects. Moreover, each of these dimensions 
is multi-faceted.  The cross-country empirical literature has measured fiscal 
decentralization as shares/ratios of sub-national fiscal resources (revenues or 
expenditures) to total public fiscal resources, using primarily the data of the Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS) Dataset of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  While these 
measures can be criticized for being too rough in measuring the actual degree of fiscal 
decentralization in a country, they remain the preferred alternative as they rely on data 
with consistent definitions across a large number of countries and over time. As Huther 
and Shah (1998) argue, comparable and meaningful cross-country data are essential in 
order to learn about the decentralization policy.  Moreover, it has become clear that 
detailed data with information about all main aspects of fiscal decentralization and local 
fiscal autonomy, that is comparable across countries, are not attainable in the near future.  
This study, as others in the decentralization empirical literature, uses the 
following measures as a proxy for fiscal decentralization (FD)
20
: the ratio of sub-national 
expenditures to total expenditures (FD ed) and the ratio of sub-national revenues (net of 
transfers) to total revenues (FD rd). These measures are compiled from the International 
Monetary Fund Government Finance Statistics (GFS) for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 
2002. The caveats of using these rough measures of fiscal decentralization are substantial. 
Appendix A raises key factors behind measuring appropriately the level of fiscal 
decentralization and puts forward a framework (for discussion) to support future detailed 
                                                 
20
 Other variables considered are explained in Appendix 2. 
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data collection of the multi-faced aspects of fiscal decentralization and fiscal autonomy. 
Appendix A aims at fostering discussion and building consensus on an appropriate 
framework for measuring fiscal decentralization as necessary step before more 
comprehensive data is collected uniformly across countries. 
Administrative decentralization is also multi-faceted in nature since it refers to 
different aspects of local decision-making power to deliver services. They include: 
personnel management, ownership and management of service facilities, management of 
other material resources in the sector, and administrative discretion over day-to-day 
operations.
21
   To proxy administrative decentralization, this study uses one of the core 
administrative functions that could be decentralized to local governments: personnel 
management.  Most practitioners in the field would agree that this is perhaps the core 
administrative function in relation to service delivery at the local level.  To do so, a 
dummy variable that indicates whether sub-national governments have autonomy to hire 
and fire people is used. This dummy variable is time-variant, that is, it may take values of 
zero or one for the same country in different points in time (t). For example, in  t =0,  AD 
may have a value of zero when a country (j) does not have the administrative discretion 
to hire and fire, but this may change in t=2,3, or 4 if legislative changes take place 
allowing such discretion. This dummy variable is generated combining the database of 
Political Institutions DPI (World Bank 2002), Treisman (2002), WB-OECD dataset on 
local autonomy (2004), and World Bank Development Policy and Country Reports.  
                                                 
21
 It is important to point out, however, that guidelines and rules on how the health care services should be 
performed, quality standards of health facilities and procedures, or quality standards of water are and 
should be typically set at the central level of government. All other functions are distributed between 
central and sub-national levels depending on the level of decentralization.  
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There are also different facets to the political decentralization process. It can be 
examined by looking at whether sub-national authorities are locally elected; or by looking 
at what authorities are elected at the sub-national levels: executive local authorities or 
local legislative bodies. To complicate things more a country typically has more than one 
level of sub-national government, and political devolution of power to these levels might 
be different. Finally, political decentralization can also be examined by looking at certain 
institutional arrangements such as the voice and vote power of sub-national governments 
in changes to national legislation (on issues that might affect local government) at the 
central level. The latter is also linked to how sub-national constituents are represented in 
the national parliament.  
To account for political decentralization this study uses two main variables. The 
first variable used ―political decentralization at the municipal (local) level‖ (PD le) 
indicates if municipal executive leaders are locally and democratically elected or not. 
This dummy variable will take the value of 1 if both a local elected assembly and the 
executive head of local government are locally elected. Further, countries may have rural 
and urban local governments at the same level of local government, so the dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 if at least one local of local government (e,g, cities) has a 
locally elected council and locally executive head of local government.  The second 
variable used ―political decentralization at the state level‖ (PD se) indicates if 
state/province/regional leaders and their legislature are democratically (and locally) 
elected or not.  In this case, the dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the state, province, 
or region has either an elected council or an elected head of the executive province (or 
region) government, or both.  
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Similarly to the dummy used for administrative decentralization, the two dummy 
variables used to account for political decentralization vary in time, that is, they may take 
values of 0 or 1 for the same country in different points in time. This is because in many 
countries in the sample, the political decentralization setting changed over the time span 
of our dataset.  These variables was generated using the Databases of Political Institutions 
DPI (World Bank) and Treisman (2002), background data of the World Development 
Report 2000, and World Bank Development Policy Reports and Country Reports. Table 
4.3 display summary statistics for all the decentralization variables used in this study.  
Table 4.5: Summary statistics of decentralization variables  
Dependent variables 
(Decentralization) Obs (n) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue 
Decentralization 418 0.191 0.131 0 $0.608
Expenditure 
Decentralization 396 0.211 0.150 0.008 $0.890
Administrative 
Decentralization 424 0.203 0.403 0 1
Political 
Decentralization at the 
municipal level 398 0.603 0.490 0 1
Political 
Decentralization at the 
state level 424 0.453 0.498 0 1  
 
 Additionally, Table 4.6 presents some correlation patterns among the 
decentralization variables. While the measures of fiscal decentralization, revenue 
decentralization (FD rd) and expenditure decentralization (FD ed) are highly correlated, 
measures across different dimensions of the decentralization process are much weakly 
correlated. The latter supports a chief argument made throughout this study, that is, since 
each dimension may decentralize at a different speed and level, it is critical to look more 
comprehensively at this reform when doing empirical analyses.     
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Table 4.6 Correlation Among Decentralization Variables 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
(Revenue 
Deentralization) 
FDrd
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
(Expenditure 
Deentralization) 
FDed
Administrative 
Decentralization 
(AD)
Political 
Decentralization 
at the local level 
(PDle)
Political 
Decentralization 
at the 
state/province 
level (PDse)
Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue 
Deentralization) FDrd
1
Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure 
Deentralization) FDed 0.8064 1
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.2757 0.2257 1
Political Decentralization at the local 
level (PDle)
0.1886 0.122 0.3898 1
Political Decentralization at the 
state/province level (PDse)
0.3528 0.2796 0.3311 0.5957 1
 
 
This study also generates a dummy variable called ―D‖ that takes the value of 1 
for developed countries (and an interaction term using D and fiscal decentralization—
discussed earlier in this chapter) to examine differences of the effects of decentralization 
on services in developed countries vis a vis and developing and transition countries. This 
study does the same for a dummy variable called ―T‖ that takes the value of 1 for 
transition countries. As pointed out earlier, developed countries tend to be more 
decentralized across all dimensions and tend to have higher levels of access to service 
due their more advance income situation. This can be clearly observed from the data of 
this study by applying a simple two-sample  
t-test as shown in Table 4.7a,b,c,d,e, using the dummy variable ―D‖ against all three 
dimensions of decentralization and selected variables on access to health care and water 
provision services.    
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Table 4.7a: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to 
levels of fiscal (revenue) decentralization. 
Fiscal decentralization 
(revenue decentralization)
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Group
0 342 0.165 0.006 0.116 0.152 0.177
1 (developed countries-- D) 76 0.312 0.015 0.131 0.282 0.342
combined 418 0.191 0.006 0.131 0.179 0.204
difference -0.147 0.015 -0.177 -0.117  
 
Table 4.7b: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to 
levels of administrative decentralization. 
Administrative 
decentralization 
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Group
0 348 0.144 0.019 0.351 0.107 0.181
1 (developed countries-- D) 76 0.474 0.058 0.503 0.359 0.589
combined 424 0.203 0.020 0.403 0.164 0.241
diff -0.330 0.048 -0.425 -0.235  
 
 
Table 4.7c: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to 
levels of political decentralization (at the local level). 
Political Decentralization 
(local) 
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Group
0 326 0.531 0.028 0.500 0.476 0.585
1 (developed countries-- D) 72 0.931 0.030 0.256 0.870 0.991
combined 398 0.603 0.025 0.490 0.555 0.651
diff -0.400 0.061 -0.519 -0.281  
 
Table 4.7d: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to 
access to health care (% of births attended in health facilities). 
% of birth attended in health 
facilities
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Group
0 351 0.654 0.016 0.302 0.622 0.686
1 (developed countries-- D) 76 0.986 0.002 0.014 0.982 0.989
combined 427 0.713 0.015 0.302 0.684 0.742
diff -0.332 0.035 -0.400 -0.263  
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Table 4.7e: Developed countries vs developing and transition countries as regards to 
access to water provision    
% of total population with 
access to improved water 
sources
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Group
0 348 0.784 0.011 0.205 0.762 0.805
1 (developed countries-- D) 76 0.996 0.001 0.012 0.993 0.999
combined 424 0.822 0.010 0.203 0.802 0.841
diff -0.212 0.024 -0.259 -0.166  
  
Control Variables  
Following up on the case made in chapter 3 regarding institutional aspects in 
service delivery, this study uses two variables to account for the institutional environment 
of the country:  ―control of corruption‖ and ―voice and accountability.‖ Both are 
extracted directly from the dataset ―Governance Matters‖ of the World Bank, which 
contains data from 1996-2006.
22
  This study uses data for 1996 (which were collected 
from sources dated in 1995), 2000, and 2002.  The variable ―Control of corruption  
depicts the level of corruption in the country through an aggregated  index of dozens of 
corruption measurements reported by multilateral agencies, watch dogs agencies, public 
and private think thanks and other organizations (e.g.,  Transparency International, 
regional development banks, the Heritage Foundation, Gallup International) that include 
perception of corruption of government officials of several sources, perception of 
nepotism, patronage in key policy makers, frequency of bribery in the economy, 
frequency on bribery to connect to public services and public utilities. The methodology 
to construct these aggregate measures and a detailed desegregation of each index by 
source can be found in Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi (2004).   
                                                 
22
 Governance Matters III is a dataset developed at the World Bank by Kaufman et al. (2003).  
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The variable “voice and accountability,” also from the Governance Indicators of 
the World Bank, depicts the level of citizen participation in policy making and to some 
extent accountability in the country through a composite index of dozen of variables 
related to channels of communication between citizens and the government, and social 
interaction among citizens aimed to overlook government activities. The variables in this 
index include: voter turnout in national and local elections, civil liberties (i.e., freedom of 
speech, freedom of association, freedom of press), independence of the media, political 
rights, perception on the accountability of public officials, transparency of government 
policy.  
The authors of these composite measures of corruption and voice and 
accountability acknowledge that individual measures based on perceptions always carry a 
problem of measurement error. However, they also argue that the aggregation and 
cleaning process of outliers that they undertake generates an aggregate measure that is 
likely to be better than any individual measure inside the index. Kaufmann, Kray, and 
Mastruzzi (2004, 2006, 2008) provide detailed discussion on the reliability of their 
aggregated measures.
23
 These two measures show that better control of corruption is 
correlated with higher levels of voice and accountability as shown in Table 4.7 below 
(additionally summary statistics for these variables are available in Appendix B). 
  For control variables related to the economy of a country, per capita income in 
constant U.S dollars of 2000, and per capita GDP growth are used.  Controlling for the 
level of per-capita income in a country is important since countries at higher levels of 
income tend to have better and higher quality service delivery systems (including access 
                                                 
23
 Further discussion can also be found at www.worldbank.org. 
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and intermediate outputs in service delivery).  These controls variables come from the 
World Development Indicators produced annually by the World Bank. 
In several models this empirical analysis also controls for the level of public 
spending through the ratio of public expenditure in health to GDP and for the overall 
level of per capita expenditure in health care provision.   However, it is also important to 
point out that these variables are highly correlated with the level of per-capita income in a 
country (see Table 4.8), and thus not all controls are used in all model specifications.  
The variables are also extracted from the World Development Indicators dataset of the 
World Bank. (summary statistics for the variables described above are available in 
Appendix B) 
Table 4.8:  Correlation Matrix of Control Variables  
Voice and 
Accountability
Control of         
Corruption 
Public Expenditures in 
Health as % of GDP
Per capita 
expenditures in 
Health 
Per capita GDP 
(in constant 
2000 USD)
Voice and Accountability
1
Control of         
Corruption 
0.8442 1
Public Expenditures in 
Health as % of GDP
0.7102 0.736 1
Per capita expenditures 
in Health 
0.689 0.8083 0.763 1
Per capita GDP (in 
constant 2000 USD)
0.7113 0.8292 0.7255 0.9751 1  
 
Estimation Methods and Econometric Issues 
For the two general models highlighted earlier, this study applies three different 
econometric estimation methods: (i) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Fixed Effects, 
(ii) first differencing, and (ii) system general method of moments (System GMM). The 
fixed effects and first-differencing methods have a similar purpose, namely controlling 
for country specific invariant effects.  The aim of doing first-differencing in parallel to 
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fixed effects is to check the robustness of the coefficients for our independent variables of 
interest as these methods employ different methodological approaches.  First-differencing 
places a harder strain on the data (i.e., variables) and model specifications, which helps in 
that objective.   
This section discusses how these econometric estimation methods fit the 
hypotheses and models we discussed earlier given the nature of the data and variables in 
this research.   
Fixed Effects 
Given the cross-country nature of the dataset used in this research, there is a 
strong rationale for choosing fixed effects estimation to account for potential unobserved 
differences across countries. The use of fixed effects estimation is quite common in the 
literature that examines cross-country variables. In its most basic shape the fixed effects 
estimation can be represented in the following way:  
itiitit
ucxy 
1
  (4.3) 
 Where  
it
x  are a set of  k =1,…,6 set of independent variables that change in time 
(t). 
i
c  represents unobserved or omitted variables such as country specific characteristics 
that are time invariant. By subtracting iy  from ity  in (4.3) for each period of time t, ic  
can be eliminated (Wooldridge 2002). Here it is important to point out that under strict 
exogeneity assumption (that is, 
iitiitit
cxcyyE ),/( ) on the explanatory 
variables (
it
x ) the fixed effect estimator is unbiased. Nevertheless, the fixed effect 
estimation allows for arbitrary correlation between ci  and the set of variables 
it
x   
(Wooldridge 2002, Greene 2000) 
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Applied to our general models and further elaborating, we would have the 
following equations representing our original (4.1) and (4.2) equations, respectively:  
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 Note that country individual and time dummies are applied. The N-1 individual 
country dummies cdj,it equal 1 if i=j, and equal zero otherwise. The T-1 time dummies 
tds,it equal 1 if t=s, and zero otherwise.  
Key to the fixed effects estimator is to the assumption of homoskedasticity of the 
uit. Furthermore, checking for the problem of serial correlation in a panel time series 
such as the one used here is critical to the efficiency of the estimators. Thus, following 
the procedure described in Wooldridge (2002) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005)— 
which is in turn is based on White (1980) and Eicker (1967)— the standard errors for 
models (4.3) and (4.4) were estimated using a panel robust estimate of the asymptotic 
variance matrix which controls for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.   
First Differencing  
Another way to control for country specific differences and other omitted 
variables (represented as ci in equation (4.3)) is to perform first-differencing. As 
discussed earlier, this method put an increased stress on the variables and models. This 
method basically does the following transformation to eliminate the unobserved time 
invariant country effects of our data:  
ititit uxy    (4.6) 
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 Where ity = ity - 1, tiy ; the same is done for the independent variables and the 
error term. Applying this method to the general models (4.1) and (4.2) we would have the 
following:   
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where 1,  tkikitkit AAA ; 1,  tiitit  ; 1,  tiitit A ; i=1,..,N; t=2,..,T 
Since we have a small T (i.e., T=4) and a relatively large N, the difference in the 
efficiency of estimators between the ones generated by the fixed effects and the first-
differencing methods would basically depend on the level of serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors (Wooldridge 2002). Thus, if on one extreme  itu  are serially 
uncorrelated then the fixed effect estimator would be more efficient; and if on the other 
extreme itu  follows a random walk then the first-differencing estimator would be more 
efficient. Since there is only a very mild serial correlation in the errors, both fixed effects 
and first differencing estimators are performed and reported later.  
To control for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, the standard errors 
for the first-differencing models, which results are presented and discussed in the next 
section, were computed using a panel robust estimate of the asymptotic variance 
matrix—described in Wooldridge (2002) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) (see also 
White 1980). 
System Generalized Method of Moments (System GMM) 
The issue of endogeneity is sometimes raised when looking at the effect of 
institutional reforms on some development indicators, particularly when the left hand side 
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variable in the regression is a measure of economic growth.  However, this is not 
common in the literature related to the effects of decentralization on different variables 
related to service delivery using cross-country analysis (Treisman 2002)(see also 
literature review in Chapter 2 for a discussion of the most typical relationships evaluated 
in the literature of this topic). As Chapter 3 discusses, understanding why decentralization 
reform is initiated is important, and while a significant portion of the literature suggests 
that decentralization reform is exogenous to service delivery, the issue is remains 
unresolved since a counterpoint could also be made (see Chapter 3). The rationale that 
can be articulated against exogeneity is straightforward: documented international 
experience shows that decentralization processes in most countries did not start with the 
objective of improving public services and economic efficiency, but rather they were 
initiated owing to political reasons (regional tensions, power sharing agreements, and 
other of similar kind). The counter argument is that under-provision or regional 
inequality in service provision could be part a reason for regional tensions or a reason for 
deepening decentralization reforms already in place.  
Thus, to provide a more complete examination, this study addresses the 
possibility of endogeneity through the use of the System GMM estimation method. Good 
―external‖ instrumental variables that, in a way, can reflect the trends of the 
decentralization process and are readily available for use, do not exist. The situation is 
even worse if we look for suitable time variant instrumental variables for each dimension 
of the decentralization process. The only way is to use ―internal‖ instruments, thus, to 
deal with the issue this research uses an estimation method called system generalized 
method of moments or simply ―system GMM‖. This is a modified version of the 
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―difference GMM‖ method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)24  widely used to 
deal with endogeneity issues in panel (time series) data through the use of lagged 
variables and a sophisticated construct with a number of properties as briefly explained 
below.        
The original Arellano and Bond (1991) ―difference GMM‖ treats the regression 
model as a system of equations, one for each t . The predetermined and suspect 
endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own 
levels.  Strictly exogenous regressors, as well as any other instrumented variables (i.e., 
suitable lags of existing independent variables), and are lumped into a matrix using first 
differences, with one column per instrument.  Both GMM estimators (that is, ―difference 
GMM‖ and the newer ―system GMM‖) were designed for dynamic panels that have 
―small T and large N‖ (that is, few periods in time and many individual observations), a 
linear relationship; a dependent variable that is dynamic, independent variables that are 
not strictly exogenous, fixed individual effects (in our case country effects), and  
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals (Roodman 2007; see also 
STATA 10 manuals 2007). 
As articulated by Bond (2002) and Blundel and Bond (1999) the problem with the 
original ―difference GMM‖ estimator is that lagged levels can sometimes be weak 
instruments when using first-differenced estimators, and more so for series that are highly 
persistent (that is, those that follow close to a random walk). Moreover, these estimators 
can also be subject to large finite sample biases (Blundell 2002)    
                                                 
24
  The difference GMM draw on the original Generalized Method of Moments first introduced by Hansen  
(1982)  
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 The ―system GMM‖ estimation we use in this research was developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). A simple way to differentiate 
this innovation from the original method (i.e., difference GMM) is provided by Roodman 
(2006) who states that while the ―difference GMM‖ instruments differences (or 
orthogonal deviations) with levels, the system GMM instruments levels with differences. 
Indeed, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) add transformed 
equations in levels to the system, helping to increase the efficiency of the estimators, 
particularly for panels with small number of time periods (i.e., small T) (see Monte Carlo 
simulations supporting this point in Bond 2002 and in Blundell and Bond 1998).  In these 
added equations, suspect endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with suitable 
lags of their own first differences. All the assumptions and workings for this procedure 
are articulated in detail in Blundell and Bond (1998) (see also Roodman 2006).
25
   
The proposed estimation applied to our original models would be as follows:  
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The regression ran using "system GMM" offered consistent estimates since error 
terms between panels are not correlated (e.i. Δεit is not correlated with Δεi-1,t ). Standard 
errors for this model were estimated using Windmeijer’s (2000 and 2005) finite-sample 
correction in order to correct for possible bias in the two-step estimator covariance matrix 
(see also Roodman, (2006)) 
 
                                                 
25
 While the operationalization of the ―difference GMM‖ in a STATA command has been in use for many 
years, the command for the ―system GMM‖ for STATA is rather recent (developed by Roodman 2006). 
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Discussion of Results   
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
The regression results obtained through three different estimation methods (fixed 
effect, first differencing, and system GMM) generally provide evidence supporting 
hypotheses 1 and 2.   Under most specifications of the general model 4.1 (discussed 
earlier in this chapter) the results show a positive and statistically significant effect of 
fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization on the variables used to measure 
access to health care and improved water source provision. These relationships are 
independently discussed below.  
Decentralization and health care access 
 Table 4.9 show two sets of specification models each run through the three 
estimation methods selected (discussed earlier).  Models specifications 1, 3 and 5 use the 
percentage of births attended in health facilities as dependent variables; and models 2, 4, 
and 6 use the percentage of births attended by skilled personnel as dependent variables.  
As regards to hypothesis 1, the regression results show that the effects of fiscal 
decentralization and administrative decentralization across most model specifications are 
statistically significant and with the expected (positive) signs. More specifically, 
estimations roughly predict that 1 percent increase in fiscal decentralization (that is, 1 
percentage point more in sub-national revenues over total revenues) may increase the 
percent of births in health facilities in a country by a range of 0.22 percent to 0.5 percent 
depending on the specification in the OLS fixed effects model. Fiscal decentralization 
(particularly revenue decentralization) is highly significant across specifications and 
model estimations, even at 1% significance level in some cases. Administrative 
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decentralization also has a positive and significant effect in the regressions (including at 
the 1% level in several specifications), although not in all model specifications.   
The effect of political decentralization is significant only in one specification in 
Table 4.9 and in other specifications shown in Appendix C, but clearly the significance of 
this variable is not robust across specifications (a number of additional regression results 
and model specifications for this relationship can be found in Appendix C) 
 These results strengthen the case argued through this research about the 
importance of accounting for all dimensions of the decentralization process when 
investigating the effects of this reform on any economic, institutional, or social variable. 
The broad policy implications of these results are highly relevant. As discussed in this 
research, decentralization reform implemented only through one dimension may render 
fewer positive fruits in terms of access to services than a multi-dimensional approach. 
Moreover, the specific results presented in Table 4.9 it also show the strength and 
importance of fiscal and administrative decentralization processes for improving access 
to basic health care services.   
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Table 4.9: Estimation results on decentralization effects on health care access- 
Hypotheses 1 and 2   
Dependent Variable     =====>
Estimation method -------------------->
Model Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1    
Fiscal (revenue) Decentralization (FD rd) 0.499 0.224 0.48 0.334 -0.029 0.739
[2.73]*** [1.81]* [2.62]** [2.18]** [0.28] [2.01]**
Political Decentralization (local/municipal) (PD le) 0.013 0.036 0.030 0.016 0.035 -0.014
[0.66] [2.01]** [1.36] [0.60] [0.64] [0.29]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.044 0.037 0.027 0.044 0.061 0.013
[2.75]*** [1.92]* [1.70]* [2.76]*** [3.02]*** [0.41]
Developed Countries Dummy (D) 0.122 0.000 0.000  
[1.86]* [.] [.]  
(D*FDrd) -0.525 -0.46 -0.256
[2.70]*** [2.47]** [1.05]
Transition Countries Dummy (T) 0.801 0.000 0.000
[30.96]*** [.] [.]
(T*FDrd) -0.053 0.082 -0.469
[0.22] [0.28] [1.09]
GDP per capita /2 0.0009 0.0010 0.0018 0.0020 0.0006 0.0008
[2.99]*** [2.36]** [2.39]** [0.32] [1.93]* [0.51]
Voice and Accountability -0.013 0.013 0.092  
[1.00] [0.82] [2.41]**  
Control of Corruption -0.015 0.014 0.135
[0.96] [0.84] [2.33]**
Per capita health expenditure /2 0.021 0.022 0.012 0.014 0.025 0.022
[0.73] [1.27] [0.16] [0.47] [1.23] [2.62]***
Constant 0.776 0.021 0.00 -0.001 0.281 0.615
[13.90]*** [1.30] [0.23] [0.20] [5.26]*** [4.62]***
Observations 286 280 148 150 216 224
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.32 0.29
Number of panels 94 98
Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
System GMM
 % of births attended in health facilities (model specifications 1, 3, 5)                                                     
% of births attended by skilled personnel (model specifications 2,4,6) 
Fixed Effects First Differencing
 
 
To test Hypothesis 2, recall that an interaction term between the fiscal (revenue) 
decentralization variable (FDrd) and a dummy created for developed countries (D) was 
generated (that is, FDrd * D –see discussion of this term earlier in this chapter).  This 
interaction term is aimed at depicting a different slope in the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on access to health care services for developed countries as opposed that 
effect for non-developed countries (i.e., developing and transition countries). The same 
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was done for a second dummy created for transition countries (T) (with the interaction 
term T * FDrd). Again the objective was to check if changes in fiscal decentralization 
have a different effect on access to health care in transition countries compared to the 
rest.   
The results obtained for this vector (i.e., negative sign) support the expectation of 
Hypothesis 2 that developed countries would benefit less from increased decentralization 
perhaps given their already higher level institutional and economic consolidation. The 
results are highly significant in model 1 and 3 in Table 4.9.  
These results imply that developing countries could benefit significantly more 
from decentralization than developed countries. Thus, the policy implications are 
important for reforms in the developing countries.  If indeed a decentralization process 
can produce larger positive effects on access to basic health services in these countries, 
designing adequate decentralization frameworks could help significantly in increasing the 
quality of life of their citizens through better access to services, which would, together 
with other aspects, contribute to improve health outcomes of the population. This 
research pursued a similar approach to observe different effect for transition countries, 
but the results were rather inconclusive.    
Some of the control variables for institutional environment also produced 
interesting results (see table 4.9 and Appendix C), although not across all specifications. 
In some models, positive changes in the variable representing accountability and citizen 
participation and control of corruption had a positive impact on access the health care 
variables.
26
 That is, showing that improving the level of citizen engagement in policy 
                                                 
26
 The models regressed contain only one of these institutional variables in each specification. As discussed 
earlier the two variables used (control of corruption and voice and accountability) are highly correlated. 
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making and social interaction among citizens aimed to overlook government activities 
(—or accountability) and improving control over corrupt practices increases access to 
basic health care services.  As expected the control variable for level of income was also 
significant across most specification in Table 4.9. This was expected because in higher 
income countries the population tends to have higher levels of access to basic services, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  Fewer specification models showed per capita 
expenditures in health as statistically significant, especially in the presence of the income 
variable.   This perhaps occurred because the income variable absorbed most of the 
explanatory power in our specification models.   
Decentralization and Access to Improved Water Sources  
As in the case of health, the results support the strategy of using all three 
dimensions of decentralization in the same model to have a clearer picture of 
decentralization reform effect on access to services. Table 4.10 shows the results of this 
reform on access to improved water source. Even though we see statistical significance 
for all three dimensions in several specifications (see also Appendix C), the 
decentralization dimension that shows more robustness is political decentralization at the 
local (municipal) level (PDle). The size of the coefficients attached to fiscal 
decentralization are smaller in the case of access to improved water source than in the 
case of health care, though still statistically significant across most specifications. 
Administrative decentralization also seems to play a key role in delivering a better access 
to this service, although this variable was not significant in all specifications.  
Overall it seems that having locally elected municipal leaders and councils matter 
a great deal for improving access to improved sources of drinking water. This somewhat 
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contrasts with the case of health care, where political decentralization seemed less 
important. One could explain this by relating it to the structure of governments and how 
they are organized to provide public services. That is, health care has a well-established 
central line ministry in each country with significant non-discretionary spending (wages, 
utilities and other recurrent spending), and changes in fiscal and administrative 
arrangements, if properly done through local governments, may have the potential of 
increasing efficiency and access in services provided (as discussed earlier). In contrast, 
water provision, which is typically provided locally, is commonly dependent in more than 
one line ministry (or several central agencies) for its provision. Moreover, water 
provision enhancement projects are mainly driven by discretionary investments, which in 
turn are more commonly subject to political bargaining and patronage. The latter also 
implies that strong and locally elected politicians at the local level (where this service is 
delivered almost in its entirety) may be needed to generate positive changes. This finding 
is very much in line with the country studies and related literature reviewed in Chapter 2, 
which points heavily towards the importance of local politicians in improving water 
services.    
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Table 4.10: Estimation results on decentralization effects on access to improved water 
source - Hypotheses 1 and 2   
Dependent Variable     =====>
Estimation method -------------------->
Model Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal (revenue) Decentralization (FD rd) 0.444 0.021 0.16 0.132 -0.061 0.033
[1.20] [0.61] [2.09]** [1.80]* [0.39] [0.29]
Political Decentralization (local/municipal) (PD le) 0.025 0.053 0.027 0.034 0.058 0.06
[2.50]** [3.71]*** [2.71]*** [3.21]*** [2.05]** [2.15]**
Administrative Decentralization (AD) -0.005 0.014 0 0.021 0.027 0.03
[0.38] [1.06] [.] [2.20]** [1.14] [0.87]
Developed Countries Dummy (D) -0.167  0 0.057
[0.81]  [.] [0.92]
(D*FDrd) 0.72   -1.552 -0.059
[0.89]  [2.96]*** [0.37]
Transition Countries Dummy (T)  0.246 0 0.115
 [11.02]*** [.] [0.89]
(T*FDrd)  -0.157 -0.135 0.123
 [1.61] [1.41] [0.25]
GDP per capita /2 0.0018 0.0012 0.0012 0.0007 0.0021 0.0026
[0.69] [0.06] [0.93] [0.68] [1.96]** [0.66]
Voice and Accountability 0.003 -0.016 0.001 -0.018 0.002 0.007
[0.23] [0.82] [0.10] [1.05] [0.06] [0.19]
Constant 0.256 0.677 0.005 0 0.323 0.326
[10.65]*** [29.51]*** [0.65] [0.14] [3.83]*** [2.96]***
Observations 272 279 136 146 219 219
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.40 0.26
Number of panels 96 96
Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
 % of people with access to improved water source (model specifications 1, 3, 5)                                                     
% of rural people with access to improved water source (model specifications 
2,4,6) 
Fixed Effects First Differencing System GMM
 
 
 
The results obtained for the interaction term created to test hypothesis 2 once 
more yielded a negative sign and showed significance but only in few model 
specifications (one of them in Table 4.10).  As in the case of access to health care, the 
negative sign for developed countries here means that developing countries gain more in 
relation to access to improved drinking water sources from changes toward higher levels 
of fiscal decentralization. These results (as well as the ones discussed earlier) have 
important policy implications. As discussed in several parts of this research access to 
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drinking water is a core developmental issue in poorer countries, and possibly a basic 
pillar to improve living standards in general. This is particularly evident in the poorest 
countries in Africa and Asia where safe drinking water impacts people’s health and 
education outcomes (including mortality rates) and overall living conditions (WDR 
2004).  
For countries where water access is an acute problem a deeper political 
decentralization process might help (as a component of a broader reform agenda) to 
resolve the bottlenecks in the system that prevent improvement in access to improved 
sources of drinking water. As argued throughout this research, improving access to 
services may not be just an issue of financing. Thus, if decentralization has the potential 
of improving access to this service, its multi-dimensional design acquires further urgency 
and importance in the framework of institutional reforms.       
Hypothesis 3 
The regression results obtained through three different estimation methods (fixed 
effect, first differencing, and system GMM) provide some evidence in support of 
hypothesis 3, though it is not as robust compared to that obtained for hypothesis 1. One 
explanation for this may be that the way in which administrative and political 
decentralization variables are measured, that is, with dichotomous variables that change 
over time. This situation does not allow for sufficient variation in estimation methods 
such as the ones used here which put significant strain on the data.   
Nevertheless, under several specifications of the general model 4.2 (discussed 
earlier in this chapter) the results show an additional positive and statistically significant 
effect of the interaction of two decentralization dimensions on access to health care and 
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water services, that is, a positive effect in addition to the statistically significant and 
robust positive effect of each decentralization variable individually measured in the 
regressions. Recall that the aim of these interaction terms is to examine if, in addition to 
each dimension independently measured, the interaction between two dimensions 
(whichever they may be) would create an additional (or extra) positive effect on access to 
services such as health care and water provision.  These relationships are discussed 
below. 
Decentralization and health care access 
As in the other regressions discussed so far, the variables accounting for fiscal 
decentralization, political decentralization, and administrative decentralization show, 
individually, a positive and statistically significant effect on health care access. Table 
4.11 shows regression results using the percentage of births attended in health care 
facilities and the immunization coverage (percentage) of DPT as dependent variables that 
measure health care access (additional regression results and model specification for this 
relationship can be found in the Appendix C).     
Among the possible interaction terms between two dimensions of fiscal 
decentralization, four specific interactions showed to be positive and statistical significant 
at the 10 percent and 5 percent significance level, and in one case; these are the 
interactions between: (i) fiscal decentralization (revenue decentralization) and political 
decentralization (officials elected at the municipal level); (ii) fiscal decentralization and 
administrative decentralization (relative autonomy to hire and fire personnel); and (iii) 
administrative decentralization and political decentralization.   
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Table 4.11: Estimation results on decentralization effects (with interactions) on health 
care access- Hypothesis 3   
Dependent Variable     =====>
Model Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1   
Fiscal (revenue) Decentralization (FD rd) 0.06 0.231 0.298 0.12 0.1 0.745
[0.39] [2.02]** [2.26]** [2.05]** [0.41] [2.50]**
Political Decentralization (local/municipal) (PD le) 0.053 0.035 0.046 0.045 0.025 -0.004
[2.28]** [1.99]** [2.04]** [3.84]*** [0.59] [0.09]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.057 0.045 -0.009 0.043 0.17 0.115
[2.76]*** [1.86]* [0.54] [2.21]** [1.65]* [2.10]**
(FDrd*AD) 0.047 -0.121 0.0504
[2.04]** [1.67]* [1.88]*
(AD*PDle) 0.077 0.036 0.015
[2.76]*** [1.66]* [1.75]*
GDP per capita /2 0.0020 0.0092 0.0026 0.0099 0.0017 0.0084
[2.06]** [0.92] [0.18] [0.36] [0.93] [1.45]
Voice and Accountability  -0.016 0.011 0.082
 [1.03] [0.72] [1.78]*
Control of Corruption -0.019 -0.017 0.158
[0.88] [1.59] [3.14]***
Public health expenditure as %of GDP 0.035 0.06 0.048
[1.57] [0.09] [1.65]*  
Per capita health expenditure /2  0.004  0.003  0.005
[0.64] [1.42] [2.17]**
Constant 0.864 0.809 0 -0.002 0.346 0.58
[16.99]*** [17.34]*** [0.05] [1.76]* [3.69]*** [5.89]***
Observations 284 280 139 283 220 224
R-squared 0.94 0.99 0.37 0.3
Number of panels  96 98
Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
Fixed effects First Differencing System GMM
 % of births attended in health facilities  (model specifications 1, 3, 5)                                                                           
Immunization coverage (%) for DPT (model specifications 2,4,6)
 
 
The rationales behind these results (and behind the interaction between 
dimensions of decentralization) have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but in short, 
these results  provide some support for the argument that additional positive value arises 
from the cross-linkages between decentralization dimensions, which goes beyond the 
individual contribution of each dimension.  In our analysis, this added value manifests 
itself as better access to health care, and potentially it works its way through several 
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avenues, including: (i) higher autonomy in the decision making on how to use public 
resources and thus better match between local public spending in local needs, as 
theoretically expected; (ii) better match between local needs and local public spending 
due to local accountability; and (iii) local autonomy in decision making of resources 
supported by the legitimacy of locally elected officials.  
From the results discussed it is clear that all three dimensions of decentralization 
are important individually. Moreover, there seems to also to be an extra value added 
(aside from the positive effect of each individual dimension) arising from the inter-
linkages and mutually reinforcing effects of having more than one dimension of 
decentralization in place. This, in turn, implies that by not having a multi-dimensional 
approach to decentralization reform countries may be losing out on positive effects on 
access to health care services. A second key corollary policy implication is that 
decentralization results depend heavily on reform design. Design issues, including those 
within each dimension (recall that each dimension also embeds several facets), are at the 
forefront when decentralization processes are evaluated in detail (See Appendix C for a 
detailed discussion on assessing the different facets of fiscal decentralization). Finally, a 
third implication is that decentralization reform is a process in itself and might gain over 
time from added dimensions and the deepening of the dimensions implemented over 
time. 
Decentralization and Access to Improved Water Sources  
The variables accounting for fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, and 
administrative decentralization (individually) show positive and statistically significant 
effects on access to improved water source, although similarly to the discussion on this 
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relationship for hypotheses 1 and 2, political decentralization is the most robust variable 
across specifications (see Table 4.12 and Appendix C). The results shown in Table 4.12 
as regards to the interaction terms suggest that three interactions between dimensions of 
decentralization seem to matter. The interaction between fiscal decentralization (revenue 
decentralization) and political decentralization (officials elected at the municipal level) 
and fiscal decentralization and administrative decentralization show significance only at 
the 10% confidence level (and not so robustly across model specifications). The 
interaction between, administrative decentralization and political decentralization in 
several model shown in Appendix C shows significance but not across model 
specifications. Also, these results are not robust across estimation methods.  
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Table 4.12: Estimation results on decentralization effects (with interactions) on access to 
improved water source - Hypothesis 3   
Dependent Variable     =====>
Model Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.251 -0.035
[2.20]** [2.08]** [2.47]** [2.05]** [1.91]* [0.25]
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.056 0.041 0.065 0.045 0.093 0.024
[3.28]*** [3.47]*** [3.63]*** [3.84]*** [2.28]** [0.57]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.022 0.048 0.021 0.043 0.024 0.021
[1.74]* [2.23]** [1.90]* [2.21]** [1.07] [0.46]
(FDrd*PDle) -0.093 0.121 -0.179
[1.25] [1.66]* [1.26]
(FDrd*AD) 0.132 0.19 0.101
[1.60] [1.67]* [0.67]
GDP per capita /2 0.0021 0.0018 0.0012 0.0007 0.0028 0.0021
[0.76] [0.67] [0.56] [0.38] [0.74] [1.88]*
Constant 0.886 -0.002 -0.002 0.239 0.241
[47.31]*** [1.64] [1.76]* [2.24]** [3.10]***
Observations 383 283 283 285 285
R-squared 0.98 0.3 0.3
Number of panels 97 97
Panel robust t and z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies, as well as lagged executed Y and T variables from the GMM are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
First Differencing System GMMFixed Effects 
 % of people with access to improved water source                                                  
 
Note that political decentralization is present in both interactions, which is 
consistent with the results obtained earlier for this variable.  The policy implications are 
quite similar to those articulated earlier for the case of decentralization and access to 
healthcare, and thus reiteration would be redundant. But perhaps one important variation 
in the relation between decentralization and access to improved drinking water source, 
that is, the political decentralization dimension continues to be the variable that matters 
most for increasing access to improved water source for citizens. Therefore, in countries 
where access to improved water sources is thought to be the most acute problem, 
reformers may have to consider an ―authentic‖ and deep political decentralization as the 
  87 
core pillar of the decentralization process
27
, while accompanying the process with 
administrative and fiscal measures to strengthen local accountability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Recall from Chapter 3 that countries tend to advance more one dimension of decentralization than the 
other two. This seems rather a natural process that depends on country conditions, characteristics, and 
political environment.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
While most countries have initially pursued the process of decentralization of 
powers to local governments seeking political and regional stabilization and changes in 
governance through power sharing, improved service delivery has been cited as an 
argument for continuing and deepening this reform. Many of the anticipated benefits of 
decentralization are based on the premise that this policy would bring local decision-
makers closer to their constituents and their needs. Thus, and along the reasoning of the 
fiscal federalism literature, local decision-makers would be able to better tailor services 
and public spending patterns to local needs improving access, efficiency, and quality of 
services.  
This research builds further on the existing conceptual framework of 
decentralization and service delivery and provides an empirical examination of the effects 
of decentralization reforms on access to two key services: health care and improved 
drinking water sources. This study is particularly motivated by four factors. First, a 
critical question in development economics is what kind of institutional reforms 
developing and transition countries should undertake to improve basic service delivery; 
and decentralization is commonly discussed as one of such reforms. Second, despite the 
existence of a large body of literature on the impact of decentralization on government 
size, growth, and macro-economic stability, there are fewer studies that have evaluated 
the effects of decentralization on service delivery across countries. Third, most of the 
research conducted on this relationship evaluates the effects of the decentralization on 
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final outcomes of public services (e.g., infant mortality), which presents a number of 
attribution and spurious effects problems, instead this research uses access to services or 
intermediate outputs to establish a more direct link. And fourth, the vast majority of 
empirical literature in this topic has analyzed decentralization from a single dimension, 
that is, either: fiscal, administrative, or political; but not from all three dimensions 
simultaneously, which seems to be critical and it is attempted in this study.  
The following three hypotheses were evaluated: (1)  changes toward higher levels 
of fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization (all) help to increase access to 
health care and improved water sources for the population; (2) changes toward higher 
levels of fiscal decentralization have a stronger positive effect on access to health care 
and improved water provision for the population in developing countries compared to 
those effects in developed and transition countries; and (3) the inter-linkages of at least 
two dimensions of the decentralization present in a country would further increase the 
overall positive impact on access to services of this reform. 
The regression results obtained through three different estimation methods  
provide evidence supporting a positive and significant effect of fiscal, administrative, and 
political decentralization, individually, on the variables used to measure access to health 
care, though the positive impact of political and administrative decentralization were 
smaller in size than that of fiscal decentralization, though still robust across 
specifications. In contrast, for the case of access to improved water provision, while all 
three dimensions of decentralization dimension showed a positive effect, political 
decentralization at the local level (that is, locally–municipal- elected leaders) level 
showed the strongest and most robust effect.  
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These findings support the case argued throughout this study about the 
importance of considering all dimensions of the decentralization process when 
investigating the effects of this reform on any economic, institutional, or social variable. 
The policy implications are highly relevant: decentralization implemented only through 
one dimension may render fewer positive fruits in terms of access to services than a 
multi-dimensional approach. The apparent larger impact of fiscal and administrative 
dimensions in the case of health care might have important implications for the design of 
decentralization strategies. Moreover, the strength of the effect of political 
decentralization in the case of access to improved water source indicates that improving 
access to this service is not just an issue of finance or administrative powers, but as it 
appears one predominantly of local political accountability that can be complemented 
with fiscal and administrative powers at the local levels to further strengthen local 
accountability.   
The results obtained also support the expectation that developed countries would 
benefit less in terms of access to health care and water provision from changes in 
decentralization (that is, increasing levels of decentralization) probably because of their 
already strong service delivery platform and their higher level of institutional and 
economic consolidation. At the same time, this finding implies that developing countries 
could benefit significantly more from decentralization than developed countries. The 
policy implications of the latter are highly relevant for policy makers in developing 
countries in the context of on-going institutional reforms. If a decentralization process 
can render larger positive effects on access to services, designing adequate 
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decentralization frameworks in these countries could help significantly in increasing the 
quality of life of their citizens through better access to services.  
This study pursued a similar approach to observe different effects for transition 
countries, but the results were rather un-conclusive, perhaps because most transition 
countries inherited a rather strong service delivery system, that is, for their income level. 
Although this does not rule out the benefits of deepening decentralization processes in 
these countries given that there is evidence of service quality deterioration partly 
attributable to lack of local autonomy to handle services at the local level and perverse 
incentives centrally driven affecting budget formation at the local level (World Bank 
2007; World Bank 2008).    
  The results obtained in this study also suggest that there is an additional positive 
effect coming from the interaction of two decentralization dimensions on access to health 
care and water services (that is additional to the individual effect of each dimension of 
decentralization).  Examining an ―extra‖ effect arising from the inter-linkages of at least 
two decentralization dimensions was aimed at checking if the whole (effect of the multi-
dimensional reform) was larger than the sum of the parts. Although the results are 
significant only at 10% level (and in one case at the 5% level) they provide some support 
for the hypothesis that those inter-linkages between dimensions have an extra positive 
mutually-reinforcing effect on improving access to services.  
The two interactions that were most commonly significant in the regressions for 
the case of health care were that of:  fiscal decentralization and administrative 
decentralization (autonomy to hire and fire personnel at the local level); and that of 
administrative decentralization and political decentralization. In the case of access to 
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improved access to drinking water, the two interactions that seemed to matter (but only at 
the 10% confidence level) were that between fiscal decentralization (revenue 
decentralization) and political decentralization (officials elected at the municipal level), 
and that of administrative decentralization and political decentralization. Drawing on 
these results, one could argue that this ―extra‖ value added in improving access to health 
care and water provision could be occurring through several mutually reinforcing aspects, 
for example, a better match between local needs and locally driven public spending due, 
in part, to local political accountability. 
In addition, the results of this study suggest that control variables related to the 
institutional environment also produce interesting results. For example,  positive changes 
in the variable accounting for accountability and citizen participation (that is, improving 
the level of citizen engagement in policy making and the communication between 
citizens and the government and social interaction among citizens aimed to overlook 
government activities—or accountability) had positive impact on access to health care in 
the presence of decentralization reform.  The opposite effect was found for the level of 
corruption variable, although with few coefficients with statistical significance across 
specifications.     
There might a number of ways of interpreting the results of this study and the 
readers should be cautious about any strong policy prescriptions based on them as well 
known pitfalls of working with cross-country data also applies. Moreover, future research 
could focus efforts on refining decentralization measures across countries. Single country 
level work would continue to be interesting but specially if asymmetric decentralization 
(that is, if asymmetric decentralization can be observed in a country) is analyzed across 
  93 
jurisdictions of a country (that is, examining how different levels of decentralization any 
given socio-economic variable in each jurisdiction).     
  
Nevertheless, findings of this study s support the premise that each dimension of 
decentralization individually is highly relevant in their effect on access to services. 
Moreover, there is some support to the belief that the inter-linkages between 
decentralization dimensions generate further positive benefits for improving access to 
services. Thus, it seems clear that countries not applying all three dimensions with a 
coherent reform design would be loosing some of fruits this reform can offer as regards 
to improving access to basic services such as health care and safe drinking water for the 
population. Moreover, the results also support the premise that the relevance of 
decentralization reform and its design is higher in developing countries.   
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APPENDIX A 
THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATING AND MEASURING FISCAL 
DECENTRALIZATION  
Decentralization is a complex multi-dimensional process that involves fiscal, 
administrative and political aspects. Moreover, each of these dimensions is multi-faced 
by itself as it involves several features that need to be taken into account. Evaluating their 
impacts on different socio-economic and institutional outcomes requires the ability to 
asses each dimension of a decentralization process in a detailed way.  To measure fiscal 
decentralization in empirical work, researchers typically use the shares of revenues and 
expenditures that flow through sub-national budgets, using the GFS data collected 
annually by the IMF.  While these measures can be criticized for being too rough in 
measuring the actual degree of fiscal decentralization in a country, they remain the only 
way to consistently make cross country comparisons over time.  
Understanding that comparable data depicting in detail all the key aspects of fiscal 
decentralization is non-existent for most countries, it seems clear as Bird (1995, 2001) 
argues, that the empirical literature will likely have to live with the existing limitations.  
Nevertheless, before efforts are placed on collecting more comprehensive data, it is 
essential to develop consensus on a framework that contains the different aspects of fiscal 
decentralization that are worth measuring, that can be measurable, and for which data can 
be actually collected in the future across countries. Having consensus on such a 
framework would also have a more immediate value added for researchers and policy 
makers working in a single-country context by helping them to evaluate more precisely 
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key components of the fiscal decentralization process and their relative level against 
certain notional benchmarks.      
 This Appendix puts forward such a focused framework for discussion (it could 
also be used on country specific analysis to determine the level of decentralization and 
reforms needed in case the country decides to move further in the process). The focus of 
assessment is in examining fiscal autonomy along the lines of the core pillars of the 
design of fiscal decentralization reforms in a country: expenditure responsibilities, 
revenue assignments, intergovernmental transfers, and sub-national borrowing.    
A simple framework to asses fiscal decentralization 
   A series of different intergovernmental facets, schemes, and structures within a 
country, need to be considered in building a framework for comprehensive measure of 
fiscal decentralization. Consider:   
),,(
iiii
BPRAEAfFD  (A.1) 
Where FD is a Fiscal Decentralization Index for country “i” ; EA is a measurement of  
local expenditure autonomy; RA is a measurement of revenue autonomy that includes tax 
and non tax revenues and transfers from upper levels of local government; and BP is 
measure of the level of the local government’s borrowing powers.   
More specifically, 
 
)*()*()*(  iiii BPRAEAFD   (A.2) 
 
Where  +  +  =1, and for simplicity ,  , and   are equal.  
Expenditure Responsibilities (EA) 
Fiscal decentralization at the core involves the shifting of expenditure 
responsibilities to lower levels of government. Assigning functions to sub-national 
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governments inherently involves a shift of power away from the center (Bahl 1999). 
Consequently, autonomy in the expenditure side is as important in measuring fiscal 
decentralization as is revenue autonomy.  
An important factor in determining the degree of fiscal decentralization is the 
extent to which sub-national governments are given autonomy to determine the allocation 
of the resources available to them. For instance, in most developing countries, a core 
source of revenue for sub-national governments comes through transfers or revenue 
sharing schemes from the center. These transfers can be structured in a way that sub-
national governments may have little discretion on how these resources are spent. The 
degrees of discretion may vary even within this category of earmarked revenues, which 
makes it difficult to measure expenditure autonomy. Moreover, as countries have several 
of these schemes and each with different levels of discretion granted to sub-national 
levels, that measurement becomes even more complicated.    
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that these shares of tied (or untied) 
spending resources are not the only factor that influences final spending allocation and 
ultimately sub-national expenditure autonomy. In fact, it is essential to examine how the 
expenditure responsibilities are decentralized.    A critical factor to account for is the 
clarity of roles in spending responsibilities of central and sub-national governments. This 
is necessary in order to reflect an accurate picture of fiscal decentralization. In some 
cases, central and sub-national levels have clear and separate roles, but in others, there 
are concurrent responsibilities and consequently central influence over sub-national 
spending, which sometimes is not clear from reading the legislation and regulatory 
framework of a country.  For example, sometimes the national government assigns 
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expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments but keeps a great level of 
discretion on critical decision-making processes. In other cases there is not clear 
responsibility assignment and overlap occurs. In these cases, sub-national governments 
often times have to follow unwritten orders from a ministerial branch of the central 
government undermining discretion in the expenditure decision making.   
Among scholars and experts on the topic, the consensus is that there is no single 
best assignment of expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments. Rather, this 
assignment needs to fit to each country’s particular characteristics and sub-national 
structure as well as general principles such as subsidiarity, efficiency (including 
economies of scale), externalities, benefited areas, administrative feasibility, and political 
accountability (Breton, Cassone, and Fraschini 1998 and Bird 2002). However, regardless 
what is decided to assign to each level of government, it is important that all levels have 
clear roles and responsibilities.  Clarity of roles and functions assigned is essential in 
providing fiscal autonomy to sub-national governments as it provides them with the 
ability to work with accountability on the devolved functions.      
Thus, consider:  
)*()*(  iii ERSDEA   (A.3) 
Where  +  =1, and  =   
And SDi is a function of different shares of spending over which local governments have 
discretion, that is: 
(fSD
i
 (a) percent of total local budget resources over which local governments do 
not have discretion;  (b)  percent of total local budget resources over which 
local governments have discretion but still have to follow certain sectoral (that 
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is, line ministry) or central spending guidelines;   (c)  percent of total local 
budget resources over which local governments have full discretion.) 
And where ERi is a function of several qualitative aspects of expenditure autonomy, that 
is:   
(fER
i
  (a) are expenditure functions and specific responsibilities clearly assigned in 
the legislation or regulatory framework (that is, clear cut roles)?;  (b) is there some 
overlapping in expenditure functions? if so, over what percent of the local spending 
envelope; (c) do ministerial line representatives at the local  impose rules that affect  how 
local budgets are formed in each sector?
28
; if so, over what portion of the local spending 
envelope?)    
Revenue Assignments and Intergovernmental fiscal transfers (RA) 
On the revenue side, the the sub-national portion of revenues used to measure 
revenue decentralization can be disaggregated to identify sub-national revenue autonomy 
in each of its components
29
 as follows:        
 
Sub-National Revenue  =     Own revenue     +   Shared revenues + Transfers              
      Total Revenue                Total Revenue                     Total Revenue                  
 
Or Disaggregating further: 
 
Sub-National Revenue  =     Own revenue   +   Shared Revenue (untied)  +   Unconditional transfers    
    Total Revenue           Total Revenue                            Total revenue 
 
                                            +   Conditional transfers (*)                     
                                                      Total Revenue                         
  
 (*) Includes the conditional (earmarked) portion of other revenue sharing schemes 
  
                                                 
28
 This issue is also closely connected with administrative decision-making at the local level, which is 
discussed in the main body of this dissertation.   
  
29
 In this desegregation we do not take into account revenues coming from borrowing, as this source 
provides financing for covering deficits or for capital spending. However, as borrowing powers are part of 
sub-national fiscal autonomy, they are discussed later in this section.  
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Each of these components has embedded in itself a degree of autonomy granted 
by the central government to sub-national governments. Combining and further 
expanding on guiding principles presented by McLure (2000), Oliveira and Martinez-
Vazquez (2001), and OECD (2002) the degree of autonomy of each of those revenue 
components is discussed below.   
Consider: 
)*()*(  iii STAORARA   (A.4) 
Where ORA is tax autonomy over own local taxes in country i. 
Own source revenues are commonly considered to be free of any condition from 
the central government, but this is not often the case. Thus, in terms of own source 
revenues (for taxes and non-taxes) or ORA in our framework, the following questions 
should be asked: (i) which level of government chooses the taxes (and fees) from which 
sub-national governments receive their own local revenue; (ii) which level of government 
defines the tax bases; (iii) which level of government sets tax rates; (iv) which level of 
government administers the taxes (actual collection and other administrative related 
functions). In some cases sub-national governments may not have the chance to define 
bases, or choose their own taxes and rates, or administer these taxes. It can also be the 
case the sub-national government can choose to impose certain taxes or charges out of a 
given list authorized by the central government. In summary, there could be different 
mixes of these features present in the regulations that own revenues have and ultimately 
they are inherent in determining the degree of fiscal autonomy.  
In a simpler way ORA could be rated from lower to higher autonomy as follows:   
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fORA
i
 [(a) sub-national governments do not have any power to set their own 
revenues’ rates and bases; (b) sub-national government are assigned certain  taxes they 
have to collect and they have some flexibility on the rate; (c) sub-national governments 
can  pick their taxes (and fees) exclusively from an authorized list of options and can not 
change rates; (d) sub-national governments can  pick their taxes (and fees) exclusively 
from an authorized list of options and have some flexibility in changing rates (within 
bands); (e) sub-national governments can  pick their taxes (and fees) exclusively from an 
authorized list of options and have full discretion on rates; (f) local governments can 
choose their taxes and rates;   
and (g) additionally this could also be evaluated examining the portion of own source 
sub-national revenues over which these sub-national governments have discretion at any 
of the levels of autonomy mentioned above.] 
STA is autonomy over transfer revenues and shared taxes (with the central 
government) in country i, and can be disaggregated in following way:   
);;(
iiii
LSTASSTAUSTAfSTA   
Where USTA is most basic level to measure the degree of sub-national autonomy 
in transfers and shared revenues, that is, the differentiation between the shares of 
conditional (or earmarked) transfers and unconditional (or untied) transfers [for 
simplicity, here we bundled untied shared revenues together with unconditional transfers, 
and earmarked revenue sharing schemes together with conditional transfers]. Or,  
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(fUSTA
i
 share of unconditional transfers (and untied shared revenues) over total 
transfers and shared revenues).
30
 
Conditional transfers (and earmarked revenue schemes) are typically tied to the 
fulfillment of a specific function, for example:  (i) financing  salaries or  utility bills; (ii) 
financing capital expenditures; (iii) financing a specific service (e.g., education); (iv) 
financing a specific bundle of local services (in this situation sub-national governments 
may have some limited latitude or discretion in allocating the money within the service 
sectors); or (v) financing  any particular spending item in local budgets.   
In the case of unconditional transfers (and untied shared revenues) it is clear that 
local governments have discretion over the spending of these resources; however, it is 
necessary to know if they carry out some sort of ―conditionalities‖.  For example, such 
―conditionalities‖ appear in supposedly unconditional transfers in Bolivia and El 
Salvador, where some untied (block) transfers are considered ―unconditional‖ but still 
have some investment restrictions behind them: in Bolivia and el Salvador a percentage 
of the unconditional block grant has to be invested in infrastructure related to certain 
services (Arze and Martinez-Vazquez 2003).  Under the specific item of 
intergovernmental transfers, the autonomy would be greater the larger the share of the 
transfers in block (untied) transfers. 
SSTA represents a portion of shared revenues and transfers over which local 
government have certain voice in its determination and/or changes; SSTA can be 
represented in the following way:    
                                                 
30
 A higher share would denote higher sub-national autonomy. 
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fSSTA
i
 [(a) percentage of revenue sharing schemes and transfers over which the 
central government can not take decision unilaterally without agreeing with 
sub-national governments;
31
 (b)percentage of revenue sharing schemes and 
transfers that are set in legislation but rules may be changed by central 
government unilaterally;
32
 (c) percentage of sharing schemes and transfers 
that are determined unilaterally each year by the central government as part 
of the national budget;
33
 (d) percent of shared revenues over which local 
governments have voice in decision  making regarding exemptions granted 
on the base and changes in rate;
34
 (e) unconditional or block transfers as 
percentage of total transfers
35] 
And, LSTA represents the degree of autonomy and stability for sub-national governments’ 
transfers and shared revenues that arises from the legal basis of the intergovernmental 
transfer system. LSTA can be represented by the function below where (a) is the strongest 
setting for the transfer system (in terms of autonomy and predictability) and (e) is the 
weakest:    
fLSTA
i
 [(a) the system is precisely determined by the constitution; (b) the general 
principles are contained in the constitution and actual criteria are approved 
with national law in agreement with sub-national governments; (c) the 
system is decided by national law (budget code or other); (d) the system is 
                                                 
31
 A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy 
 
32
 A higher percentage denotes lower sub-national autonomy 
 
33
 A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy 
 
34
 A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy 
 
35
 A higher percentage denotes more sub-national autonomy 
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decided each year in the annual budget law in agreement with sub-national 
governments; (d) the system is decided each year in the annual budget law 
and sub-national governments have no voice in its determination
36
;  
Sub-national Borrowing         
 Often, this aspect has been neglected when analyzing case studies of fiscal 
decentralization in different countries. However, it is increasingly important as the 
process of decentralization moves forward. Typically, as decentralization unfolds, sub-
national governments see growing opportunities to borrow resources from the financial 
sector and international donors. Although awareness of this issue is growing, many 
countries do not regulate borrowing powers for sub-national governments. 
37
    
In defining the degree of fiscal decentralization, accounting for borrowing 
autonomy is extremely important. As Oliveira and Martinez-Vazquez (2001) argue, 
transferring this responsibility to sub-national governments is an important step in 
developing a sense of ownership at the local level, which tends to result in improved 
capital infrastructure and efficiency in its financing. 
38
 Moreover, borrowing power may 
become an independent mechanism for fostering sub-national accountability in countries 
where the process of decentralization is fairly advanced. Indeed, the level of borrowing 
autonomy is another indication of the degree of independence of sub-national 
governments in their financing, and consequently in terms of measuring fiscal 
                                                 
36
 This variable is very important for sub-national fiscal autonomy as it illustrates issues such as legal 
ownership of revenues and transparency of the system.   
 
37
 In any case, a well-designed regulatory framework is necessary to ensure that the decentralization of 
borrowing does not provide perverse incentives to the sub-national governments (Litvack and Seddon 
2002).       
 
38
 Efficiency comes from the optimal allocation of long-term debt to capital expenditure. In addition sub-
national ownership and improved infrastructure may generate economic growth. See Oliveira and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2001) for a discussion on this issue. 
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decentralization in a country. 
39
 However, this aspect needs to be treated carefully and in 
the framework of fiscal responsibility. For example, in countries with early stage 
processes of decentralization, sub-national borrowing may be prudently limited and well-
controlled as to avoid soft-budget constraints.  
To measure sub-national borrowing autonomy we can use the following 
framework, with borrowing powers (SNBP) classified in five levels from no power to 
borrow (a) to significant powers to borrow (e) 
fSNBP
i
 [(a) no sub-national borrowing at all; (b) sub-national borrowing with tight 
ceilings (including debt ceilings on outstanding debt as percent of total 
revenues, ceilings on annual debt repayments as percent of recurrent local 
revenues or the like) and only with central government’s ex-ante control and 
authorization; (c) sub-national borrowing with ceilings (relatively increased 
compared to initial stages but still conservative) and only with central 
government’s ex-ante control and authorization; (d)   sub-national borrowing 
with ceilings but only with ex-post (annual) control from central authorities, 
tough debt registration is part of the process; (e) sub-national borrowing 
without ceilings or controls but only for local governments with credit ratings 
from internationally recognized rating companies (still registration applies)]. 
It should be highlighted, however, that as the system of sub-borrowing matures and sub-
national governments acquire more powers (or even from the very beginning) a proper 
                                                 
39
 Here is important to make clear that we do not make the case for more or less borrowing power for local 
governments. There are a variety of good reasons for which the autonomy in this regard could be restricted 
such as macroeconomic stability, poor technical ability  in risk evaluation of the sub-national governments 
as so on; See Bird, Ebel and Wallich, (1995). 
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sub-national bankruptcy framework should be in place to avoid moral hazards in lenders 
and borrowers, and to increase local officials’ accountability. 
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APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES 
 
VARIABLE NAME SOURCE 
Percentage of births attended in 
health facilities  
WHO (various years) and Millennium 
Development Indicators, United Nations 
(2003) 
Percentage of births attended by 
skilled personnel  
WHO (various years) and Millennium 
Development Indicators, United Nations 
(2003)  
Immunization coverage rates for 
DPT (children under 1 year old ) 
 WHO (various years) and Millennium 
Development Indicators, United Nations 
(2003), World Bank Development 
indicators 
Percentage of population with 
access to improved drinking water 
sources (total population) 
Millennium Development Indicators, 
United Nations (1990-2003) 
Percentage of population with 
access to improved drinking water 
sources (Urban population) 
Millennium Development Indicators, 
United Nations (1990-2003) 
Percentage of population with 
access to improved drinking water 
sources (Rural population) 
Millennium Development Indicators, 
United Nations (1990-2003) 
Fiscal decentralization measured as 
revenue decentralization and 
expenditure decentralization 
Government Finance Statistics – 
International Monetary Fund (2006) 
Administrative decentralization:  
generated dummy variable that 
indicates if sub-national 
governments can hire and fire 
people 
Combining Database of Political 
Institutions DPI (World Bank 2002), 
Treisman (2002). WB-OECD dataset 
Budget Practices and Procedures (2004) 
and DPR World Bank.     
Political decentralization 
Municipal/local government 
elections, answering the question if 
municipal/local executive and 
legislature are democratically (and 
locally) elected. 
Database of Political Institutions DPI 
(World Bank 2004) complemented by a 
review of  WB Development Policy 
Reports and Country Reports made by 
the author   
Political decentralization 
State/province elections, basically 
answering the question if 
state/province executive and 
legislature are democratically (and 
locally) elected 
Database of Political Institutions DPI 
(World Bank 2002) complemented by a 
review of  WB Development Policy 
Reports and Country Reports made by 
the author   
Citizen participation and 
accountability    
Governance Matters III (World Bank 
2003) 
Perceived corruption in the country. Governance Matters III (World Bank 
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2003) 
Public per capita Expenditure in 
each specific sector (i.e: health, 
water provision) 
World Development Indicators (2003)- 
World Bank. 
 
Private per capita expenditure in 
each specific sector (i.e: health, 
water provision) 
World Development Indicators (2003)- 
World Bank. 
Income per capita; income per 
capita growth.  
World Development Indicators (2003)- 
World Bank. 
Percentage of rural population in 
the country 
World Development Indicators (2003)- 
World Bank. 
 
 
Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
Control Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Voice and accountability 330 0.1145 0.9269 -1.81 1.72
Control of corruption 319 0.0499 1.0265 -1.89 2.48
Public health expenditure as 
%of GDP 401 0.0342 0.0196 0.00 0.09
Per Capita GDP in constant 
USD 2000 439 5740.5730 8927.0580 90.19 38200.41
Per Capita GDP growth 437 0.0196 0.0430 -0.15 0.25  
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   APPENDIX C: Regression Results 
 
Table C-1: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization effects on health care 
access- Hypotheses 1 and 2   
Dependent Variable     =====>
Model specification (1) (2) (3) 4)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD) rd 0.29 0.29 0.401 0.249
[2.36]** [2.36]** [2.17]** [1.67]*
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.028 0.036
[1.61] [2.01]**
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.018 0.018
[0.89] [0.89]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.05 0.05 0.034 0.035
[3.00]*** [3.00]*** [1.89]* [1.96]*
Developed Country (D) -0.012 0.123
[0.23] [1.81]*
(D*FD) -0.429
[2.28]**
Transition Country (T) -0.006 0.825
[0.11] [13.36]***
(T*FD) -0.114
[0.40]
GDP per capita /2 0.0009 0.0011 0.0012 0.0007
[0.38] [0.38] [1.94]* [0.29]
Control of Corruption -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
[1.03] [1.03] [0.93] [0.96]
Per capita health expenditure /2 0.0218 0.0205 0.0310 0.0293
[1.16] [1.83]* [0.84] [1.27]
Constant 0.824 0.83 0.784 0.019
[18.57]*** [11.65]*** [15.86]*** [0.97]
Observations 286 286 280 280
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of births attended in health facilities  
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Table C-2: First Differences estimation results on decentralization effects on health 
care access- Hypotheses 1 and 2   
Dependent Variable     =====>
 % of births 
attended by skilled 
personnel
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD) rd 0.30 0.36 0.56 0.478
[2.24]** [2.64]*** [3.22]*** [3.76]***
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.04
[1.84]*
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.016 0.009 0.001
[0.60] [0.36] [0.05]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.028 0.044 0.04 0.016
[1.75]* [2.76]*** [2.51]** [0.74]
Developed Country (D) 0 0
[.] [.]
(D*FD) -0.551 -0.516
[3.17]*** [3.86]***
Transition Country (T)
(T*FD)
GDP per capita /2 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 0.0011
[0.40] [0.35] [0.57] [1.85]*
Voice and Accountability 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.035
[0.59] [0.80] [1.03] [1.68]*
Per capita health expenditure /2 0.0091 0.0099 0.0087 0.0010
[0.54] [0.54] [0.33] [1.29]
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
[0.47] [0.18] [0.23] [0.22]
Observations 147 150 150 149
R-squared 0.33 0.29 0.34 0.17
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
 % of births attended in 
health facilities
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Table C-3: System GMM estimation results on decentralization effects on health 
care access- Hypotheses 1 and 2   
 
Dependent Variable     =====>
 % of 
births 
attended 
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i) 0.55 0.14 -0.049 0.13
[5.37]*** [1.21] [0.48] [1.40]
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.581 0.785
[1.85]* [2.03]**
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed) -0.006 0.264
[0.05] [1.46]
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.029 -0.021 -0.002
[0.69] [0.42] [0.05]
Political Decentralization (PD) se -0.01
[0.17]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.064 0.019 -0.004 0.048
[2.41]** [0.58] [0.14] [1.72]*
Developed Country (D) 0
[.]
(D*FD) 0.289
[1.88]*
GDP per capita /2 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0008
[0.78] [0.83] [0.34] [0.64]
Voice and Accountability 0.066 0.151 0.137 0.124
[1.15] [2.34]** [2.30]** [2.58]***
Per capita health expenditure /2 0.029 0.021 0.0270 0.0230
[0.65] [2.19]** [2.36]** [1.77]*
time==2 0.024 -0.004 -0.013 -0.003
[1.62] [0.25] [0.82] [0.25]
time==3 -0.002 0.013 0.019 0.011
[0.13] [0.79] [0.98] [0.74]
Constant 0.277 0.641 0.757 0.68
[4.30]*** [5.76]*** [7.41]*** [7.62]***
Observations 211 224 229 215
Number of panels 92 98 100 94
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
 % of births attended by 
skilled personnel
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Table C-4: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization effects on access to 
improved water source- Hypotheses 1 and 2    
Dependent variable             ======>
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.11 0.187
[1.58] [1.73]*
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed) 0.011 0.02
[0.36] [0.27]
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.051
[3.61]***
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.032 0.01 0.013
[1.61] [0.71] [0.92]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.014 0.031 0.014 0.019
[1.07] [2.61]** [1.25] [1.81]*
Developed Country (D) -0.174 -0.165
[0.86] [4.11]***
(D*FD) 0.72
[0.89]
Transition Country (T)
(T*FD) 0.214 0.167
[24.52]*** [7.60]***
GDP per capita /2 0.0011 0.0018 0.0022 0.0013
[0.09] [0.44] [0.71] [0.64]
Voice and Accountability -0.016 -0.006 0.013 0.016
[0.81] [0.32] [0.85] [0.87]
Constant 0.681 0.726 0.895 0.929
[30.85]*** [47.19]*** [31.70]*** [38.69]***
Observations 279 294 278 269
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.96
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of people with 
access to improved 
water source
% of people with 
access to improved 
water source in rural 
areas
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Table C-5: First Differences estimation results on decentralization effects on access 
to improved water source - Hypothesis 1 and 2   
Dependent variable             ======> % of people 
with access to 
improved water 
source in rural 
areas
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.956
[2.56]** [1.69]* [2.36]** [2.03]**
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed) 0.00
[0.27]
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.033 0.036
[3.15]*** [3.55]***
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.015 0.017 -0.019
[1.00] [1.19] [1.13]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.006
[3.59]*** [2.22]** [2.20]** [3.79]*** [0.69]
Developed Country (D) 0
[.]
(D*FD) -0.193
[2.30]**
Transition Country (T) 0
[.]
(T*FD) -0.886
[1.97]*
GDP per capita /2 0.0017 0.0012 0.0011 0.0007 0.0023
[2.16]** [0.55] [0.03] [0.57] [0.69]
Voice and Accountability -0.012 -0.016 -0.012 -0.013 0.002
[0.71] [0.95] [0.72] [0.78] [0.16]
Constant 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 0.006
[0.11] [0.18] [0.41] [0.13] [0.81]
Observations 149 146 142 149 139
R-squared 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.27
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of people with access to improved 
water source
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Table C-6: System GMM estimation results on decentralization effects on access to 
improved water source- Hypothesis 1 and 2   
Dependent variable             ======> % of people with 
access to improved 
water source in rural 
areas
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i) 0.571 0.405 0.356 0.504 0.571 0.32
[3.89]*** [3.29]*** [1.89]* [3.30]*** [3.90]*** [1.22]
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) -0.068 -0.004 -0.033 0.376
[0.53] [0.05] [0.29] [2.37]**
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed) -0.03 -0.02
[0.65] [0.33]
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.057 0.062 0.06
[2.23]** [3.05]*** [2.15]**
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.064 0.071 0.071
[2.42]** [3.00]*** [1.06]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.025 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.03
[0.80] [1.13] [1.43] [0.90] [0.87]
Developed Country (D) 0.069
[1.23]
(D*FDrd) -0.059
[0.37]
(D*FDed) -0.05
[0.57]
Transition Country (T) -0.115
[0.89]
(T*FD) 0.123
[0.25]
GDP per capita /2 0.0025 0.0031 0.0025 0.0031 0.0021 0.0017
[1.68]* [0.79] [1.00] [0.96] [0.66] [0.80]
Voice and Accountability -0.004 0.024 0.022 0.007 0.007 -0.034
[0.11] [0.97] [0.61] [0.23] [0.19] [1.08]
time==2 0.013 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011
[1.53] [1.13] [1.21] [1.04] [1.18] [1.18]
time==3 0.002 0 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0
[0.31] [0.07] [0.16] [0.13] [0.63] [0.01]
Constant 0.314 0.456 0.498 0.366 0.326 0.417
[3.00]*** [4.69]*** [3.36]*** [3.16]*** [2.96]*** [2.50]**
Observations 219 224 217 212 219 208
Number of panels 96 98 95 93 96 94
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of people with access to improved water source
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Table C-7: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization (additional 
interaction) effects on health care access- Hypothesis 3   
Dependent variable             ======> Immunization 
coverage (%) 
for DPT
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.25 0.42 0.30 0.27
[2.44]** [2.67]*** [1.79]* [1.66]*
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)  0.014 -0.013 0.137
 [0.25] [0.35] [2.30]**
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.032 0.066
[1.68]* [2.10]**
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.069 0.071 0.049 0.06 0.017
[2.04]** [1.95]* [1.53] [2.13]** [0.47]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.055  
[1.66]*  
(FDrd*PDle)  -0.084      
[0.63]
(FDrd*AD) -0.074         
[0.66]       
(FDrd*Pdse) -0.108 -0.074
[0.93] [0.48]
(FDed*PDse) -0.035 -0.073 -0.1
[0.28] [0.68] [0.82]
GDP per capita /2 0.0020 0.0029 0.0025 0.0039 0.0021 0.0019 0.0092
[2.11]** [1.33] [0.93] [0.69] [1.94]* [1.23] [1.93]*
Control of Corruption -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.024
[0.65] [0.78] [0.32] [0.66] [0.27] [1.02]
Constant 0.832 0.768 0.791 0.845 0.875 0.931 0.935
[27.09]*** [14.72]*** [17.51]*** [23.26]***[19.97]***[31.94]*** [30.81]***
Observations 383 294 283 283 292 281 287
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.93
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of birth attended in health facilities % of births 
attended by skilled 
personnel
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Table C-8: First Differences estimation results on decentralization (additional 
interaction) effects on health care access- Hypothesis 3   
Dependent variable             ======>
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.49 0.30 0.28 0.302 0.37 0.40
[2.63]** [2.28]** [2.24]** [2.52]** [2.01]** [2.69]***
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.109 0.031 0.033 0.038 0.081
[2.77]*** [1.47] [0.92] [2.44]** [1.57]
Political Decentralization (PD) se  0.058
 [1.46]
Administrative Decentralization (AD)  -0.015 0.059 0.031  
 [0.77] [3.02]*** [0.62]  
(FDrd*PDle) -0.25 -0.05 -0.199  
[1.49] [0.39] [0.86]
(FDrd*Pdse) -0.123
[0.65]
(FDrd*AD)  0.157   
 [0.70]   
(AD*PDle) 0.051
[2.08]**
GDP per capita /2 0.0025 0.0036 0.0024 0.0019 0.0032 0.0028
[0.49] [0.26] [1.01] [0.65] [0.95] [1.95]*
Voice and Accountability 0.014 0.025
[1.01] [1.30]
Control of Corruption -0.015 -0.018 -0.021
[1.43] [1.16] [1.37]
Public health expenditure as %of GDP -0.175
[1.03]
Per capita health expenditure /2 0.0091
[0.17]
Constant -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.003
[0.56] [0.33] [0.50] [0.24] [0.53] [0.83]
Observations 142 149 243 146 141 146
R-squared 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.2 0.12
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of birth attended in health 
facilities
% of births attended by skilled 
personnel
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Table C-9: System GMM estimation results on decentralization effects (additional 
interaction)  on health care access- Hypothesis 3   
Dependent variable             ======> % of birth 
attended in 
health 
facilities
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i) 0.499 0.66 0.65 0.06 0.175 0.207
[5.16]*** [7.65]*** [6.64]*** [0.79] [1.43] [1.79]*
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.102 0.547 0.653 0.484
[0.41] [2.25]** [3.29]*** [2.23]**
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed) -0.011 0.011
[0.12] [0.16]
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.059 0.093 -0.001 0.009
[2.03]** [1.57] [0.03] [0.20]
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.038 0.121
[0.78] [2.38]**
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.057 -0.028 0.013 0.117 -0.005
[2.35]** [0.58] [0.36] [1.45] [0.10]
(FDrd*PDle) 0.0416
[1.84]*
(FDrd*AD) 0.149 -0.419
[0.93] [1.39]
(AD*PDle) 0.035
[0.23] [0.56]
GDP per capita /2 0.0011 0.0016 0.0015 0.0082 0.0079 0.0090
[1.95]* [0.18] [0.33] [0.61] [0.24] [2.12]**
Voice and Accountability 0.065 0.027
[1.50] [0.55]
Control of Corruption 0.022 0.021 0.009 0.057
[0.38] [1.02] [0.12] [1.59]
Public health expenditure as %of GDP -0.825 1.09
 [0.48] [0.55]
Per capita health expenditure /2 0.009 0.0087
[0.80] [0.07]
time==2 0.016 0.01 0.003 -0.007 -0.002 0.005
[1.41] [0.90] [0.32] [0.47] [0.14] [0.40]
time==3 -0.01 0.001 -0.001 0.016 0.014 0.011
[1.13] [0.19] [0.14] [1.65]* [0.97] [0.64]
Constant 0.284 0.225 0.235 0.691 0.61 0.579
[5.08]*** [3.55]*** [2.78]*** [8.53]*** [4.60]*** [4.10]***
Observations 216 215 217 225 218 218
Number of panels 94 96 97 98 98 98
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
 % of births 
attended by skilled 
personnel
(Immunization coverage (%) 
for DPT
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Table C-10: fixed effects estimation results on decentralization (additional 
interaction) effects on access to improved water source- Hypothesis 3   
Dependent variable             ======> % of people with access 
to improved water 
source in rural areas
Model specification (1) (2) (3)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.044 0.13 0.354
[0.54] [2.02]** [1.29]
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed)  
 
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.041 0.042 0.021
[2.46]** [3.16]*** [2.06]**
Political Decentralization (PD) se
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.016 0.039 -0.026
[1.21] [1.82]* [0.49]
(FDrd*PDle) 0.004
[0.06]
(FDrd*AD) -0.098 0.108
[1.25] [0.54]
GDP per capita /2 0.0027 0.0018 0.002
[2.10]** [0.61] [0.67]
Control of Corruption -0.014 -0.004
[1.27] [0.37]
Constant 0.89 0.887 0.833
[44.37]*** [46.35]*** [12.00]***
Observations 281 356 265
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.96
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of people with 
access to improved 
water source
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Table C-11: First Differences estimation results on decentralization (additional 
interaction) effects on access to improved water source - Hypothesis 3   
Dependent variable             ======>
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Varibles /1
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.19 0.072 0.095 0.109
[1.88]* [1.30] [1.75]* [2.24]**
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.031 0.029 0.02
[3.08]*** [2.63]** [1.93]*
Political Decentralization (PD) se 0.031
[1.35]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) -0.007 -0.004 -0.004
[1.19] [0.67] [0.88]
(FDrd*PDse) 0.006
[0.04]
(AD*PDle) 0.032 0.029 0.033
[3.39]*** [2.76]*** [3.36]***
GDP per capita /2 0.0014 0.0009 0.0011 0.0007
[2.30]** [1.90]* [0.58] [1.34]
Voice and Accountability -0.02 -0.014
[1.30] [0.83]
Control of Corruption -0.03 -0.024
[2.46]** [2.17]**
Constant -0.002 0 0 -0.001
[0.46] [0.02] [0.06] [0.29]
Observations 147 146 146 140
R-squared 0.14 0.32 0.26 0.28
Panel robust t statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of people with access to improved water 
source
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Table C-12: System GMM estimation results on decentralization (additional 
interaction) effects on access to improved water source- Hypothesis 3   
Dependent variable             ======> % of people with access 
to improved water 
source in urban areas
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Varibles /1
Lag exec(i) 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.80
[5.40]*** [6.17]*** [4.63]*** [4.50]*** [5.03]*** [7.92]***
Fiscal Decentralization (FD rd) 0.159 0.192 0.121 0.225 0.251
[2.22]** [2.12]** [1.41] [1.53] [1.91]*
Fiscal Decentralization (FD ed) 0.041
[1.48]
Political Decentralization (PD) le 0.05 0.054 0.05 0.082 0.093
[2.13]** [2.59]*** [2.00]** [1.91]* [2.28]**
Political Decentralization (PD) se -0.023
[1.44]
Administrative Decentralization (AD) 0.028 0.037 0.03 0.034 0.024
[1.19] [0.93] [1.19] [1.74]* [1.07]
(FDrd*PDle) -0.14 -0.179
[0.79] [1.26]
(FDrd*AD) 0.055
[0.40]
(FDed*PDse) 0.06
[1.73]*
(AD*PDle) 0.009 0.013
[0.25] [0.33]
GDP per capita /2 0.0029 0.0023 0.0021 0.0020 0.0028 0.0009
[0.66] [2.07]** [0.37] [0.37] [0.74] [0.98]
Control of Corruption -0.001
[0.12]
time==2 -0.002 0.001 0 0.002 -0.001 0.002
[0.38] [0.20] [0.01] [0.34] [0.10] [0.68]
time==3 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 0.002
[0.90] [0.81] [0.97] [0.48] [0.68] [0.93]
Constant 0.254 0.248 0.267 0.264 0.239 0.206
[2.56]** [2.96]*** [2.36]** [2.31]** [2.24]** [2.26]**
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 206
Number of panels 97 97 97 97 97 93
Panel robust z statistics in brackets
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
1/ Country and time dummies are omitted in the table.
2/ Units transformed (in thousands) 
% of people with access to improved water source
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